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"Legal precedent in international dispute settlement
is neither to be worshipped nor ignored."
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, much
has been written in praise of the WTO's dispute settlement system. WTO dispute
settlement improves upon the system used by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),2 which the WTO subsumed. In particular, the WTO has a rule-
2 The GATT is a multilateral agreement that entered into force in 1947. It was negotiated in the
context of a larger effort to create an International Trade Organization (ITO), which would have
constituted the third of the three planned Bretton Woods international economic institutions (in addition
to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund). However, the ITO Charter never entered into
force, and the GATT was the vehicle pursuant to which trade negotiations were conducted for the
following several decades. In 1995, upon the entry into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
2 48:1
Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement
based structure in contrast to the GATT's more diplomatically oriented processes.
The WTO system includes two-tiered dispute settlement, automatic adoption of
panel and Appellate Body reports, and remedies in the event a losing party fails to
comply with recommendations directed towards it. WTO members have embraced
the new dispute settlement system, and have initiated several hundred disputes over
the past sixteen years. However, a systemic review of WTO jurisprudence a few
years ago' revealed a curious fact-that compared with other international
tribunals,' there had been a decided lack of dissent in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. In a previous article focusing on this phenomenon, I determined that
dissent was being actively discouraged, and argued that dissent should no longer be
avoided at all costs, but should instead be aired, as it could serve useful functions.'
More recently, a fascinating drama has played out whereby panels have not only
featured dissents amongst the three panelists, but entire panels have disagreed
with-in effect "dissented from"-Appellate Body reports. The present piece
therefore revisits the issue of dissent in WTO dispute settlement, examining both
the legal permissibility and normative desirability of horizontal and vertical
disagreement. In so doing, it develops a theory of WTO dispute settlement reports,
and disagreement therein, as a form of dialectic, or dialogue.
Part II of this article discusses the utility of dissents in dispute settlement
generally. Part III develops a theory of dissent in the WTO context. This latter Part
first explains the structure of WTO dispute settlement; second, it notes unique
attributes and competencies of WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate
Body; and third, it postulates purposes of WTO dispute settlement, including its
dialectical nature. As such, it suggests that disagreement in WTO dispute
settlement should be viewed as a part of a dialectical process, rather than a mere
desire to be disagreeable. In Part IV, I apply this theoretical framework to both
horizontal and vertical disagreements in WTO dispute settlement, considering
dissent or disagreement in each context. In the context of considering horizontal
disagreement-dissents within dispute settlement panels or Appellate Body
divisions-I respond to a recently published critique of my previous article on
dissent in WTO dispute settlement. This Part then uses the WTO's jurisprudence
in a series of related cases (all dealing with the contentious issue of "zeroing"') to
illustrate how dissent can be both horizontal and vertical. In particular, I examine
an unusual recent phenomenon whereby WTO dispute settlement panels (the
arbiters at first instance) have reached unanimous decisions, but these decisions
explicitly disagree with (or, I argue, in effect "dissent" from) previous decisions of
the WTO Appellate Body (the tribunal of last instance). This Part concludes by
examining the Appellate Body's pronouncements regarding the degree to which
panels and the Appellate Body itself should feel compelled to follow precedents. In
the GATT 1947 text, as amended and with supplementary understandings, was incorporated into the
WTO as "GATT 1994". GATT 1947 is no longer in force.
See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 895 (2006).
4 Id. at 901-902.
5 Id.
6 James Flett, Collective Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual
Opinions in WTO Jurisprudence, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 287 (2010).
"Zeroing" is a methodology used in the calculation of dumping duties. See infra Part IV of this
article for a more detailed explanation of the concept.
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Part V, the article attempts to answer a question left open by the Appellate Body-
namely, under what circumstances, if any, should panels be permitted to diverge
from previous Appellate Body precedent. I assess this question both through the
lens of statutory interpretation and through normative analysis. In Part VI, I apply
the normative criteria identified in Part V to the WTO's "dissenting" panels to
assess the appropriateness of their failure to follow the Appellate Body's decisions.
In Part VII, I conclude that raising points of difference can serve useful dialectical
purposes in the context of both horizontal and vertical disagreement. In addition, I
argue that the Appellate Body has wisely refrained from requiring panels to follow
previous Appellate Body rulings.
1I. ARE DISSENTS DESIRABLE OR DISAGREEABLE?
A. Beneficial Aspects ofDissent
In the domestic common law context, judges and academics have advanced
numerous arguments in support of the use of dissent in judicial decisions.' First,
dissents may lead to better overall opinions. If the majority knows that the minority
will, or may, write its own decision, the majority is likely to work harder to reach a
clearer, more thoroughly argued opinion that addresses the concerns of the
minority.' Justice Brennan has applied the "marketplace of ideas" concept to
dissent, arguing that the airing of opposing views will lead to better decisions: "the
best way to find the truth is to go looking for it in the marketplace of ideas. It is as
if the opinions of the Court-both the majority and the dissent-were the product
of a judicial town meeting."'0
Second, dissents may serve signaling or corrective functions, including:
providing litigants and lower courts with a roadmap for how to distinguish the
majority's position; proposing an alternative approach for subsequent jurists to
consider; spurring all members of the court to consider potential flaws in the
majority's reasoning; and signaling to the legislature the need to respond to the
majority's approach. In the words of Charles Evans Hughes: "[a] dissent in a court
of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a
future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.""
Third, the possibility of dissents helps observers reach conclusions as to the
For discussions of judicial dissent generally, see, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT (2003); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990);
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense ofDissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); Lani Guinier, Foreword:
Demosprudence Through Dissent, 22 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008); Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William
Johnson & the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069 (1995); Andrew Lynch,
Dissent: The Rewards & Risks ofJudicial Disagreement in the High Court ofAustralia, 27 MELB. U.L.
REV. 724 (2003); Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr., The Importance of Dissent & the Imperative of
Judicial Civility, 28 VA. U.L. REV. 583 (1994); Richard Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, & Judicial
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998); Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme
Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996); Lewis, supra note 3.
9 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 917.
"o Id., quoting from William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense ofDissents, supra note 8, at 430 (1986).
" CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928). See also
Kolsky, supra note 8, at 2083-85.
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relative legitimacy of decisions. A decision without dissents (9-0 in the U.S.
Supreme Court context, for example) may well seem more commanding and
definitive than one with dissent. In addition, the 9-0 ruling would gain additional
legitimacy because observers would understand that the adjudicators had the option
of dissenting yet elected not to. As such, the unanimous opinion becomes more
powerful, and is given a point of differentiation from more contentious cases. In
the absence of a right to dissent, these differences would be more difficult to
discern. 2
B. Criticisms ofDissent
Even the most ardent supporters of dissent tend to agree that dissents
should be used sparingly." Too much dissent can undermine the legitimacy of a
court in a number of ways. First, it calls into question the enduring power of the
judicial body's decisions if it regularly cannot reach consensus. Second, it can
damage the collegiality amongst members, potentially causing instability on the
bench. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg has explained, "[r]ule of law virtues of
consistency, predictability, clarity, and stability may be slighted when a court
routinely fails to act as a collegial body."l 4 Third, dissent, particularly in a court of
last instance, may reduce the influence of a given judicial decision." If dissent is
viewed as strong medicine that should only be resorted to in limited circumstances,
even in a domestic judicial system with as lengthy a history as that of the United
States, what role, if any, should it play in WTO dispute settlement? The WTO is a
relatively young institution, with a dispute settlement system that can only be used
by WTO members themselves, rather than by private actors. As such, it is
necessary to consider the WTO's unique circumstances in evaluating to what
degree arguments in favor of and opposed to dissent in the domestic judicial setting
can be imported into the WTO context."
12 Kolsky, supra note 8, at 2085-86.
13 See discussion and sources cited in Lewis, supra note 3, at 919.
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1992),
quoted in Kolsky, supra note 8, at 2087-88.
's Kolsky, supra note 8, at 2088.
16 These arguments are derived primarily from common law courts and commentators.
Traditionally, civil law systems have featured far less dissent than their common law counterparts.
While judges are often viewed as serving individual roles in the common law setting, civil law judges
may view their primary task of interpreting code provisions as institutional or administrative rather than
individual. The civil law judge may therefore be more likely to believe there is a single correct answer
and accordingly more invested in reaching consensus with his or her fellow judges. See Lewis, supra
note 3, at 910. See also Arthur Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH & LEE L REv 1607, 1631
(2005) (describing dissent as anathema to the civil law sense of "rightness" deriving from its Catholic
Church patron). The WTO dispute settlement system draws from both common law and civil law
traditions. Civil law influence is reflected in the focus on the dispute settlement system as an
institutional function, with decisions taken by the Dispute Settlement Body as a whole rather than the
reports of panels and the Appellate Body being binding of their own accord. The civil law traditions
embedded in the WTO dispute settlement system may partially explain the historical enmity towards
separate opinions. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 910-11.
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III. PARTICULARITIES OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A. WTO Dispute Settlement Structure
The WTO system has two tiers of dispute settlement. In the first instance,
complaints are heard by panels that are constituted on an ad hoc basis. Panels
generally comprise three individuals, though the parties can elect to have five
panelists hear their dispute." Following the issuance of a panel's report, the parties
can opt to appeal. Appeals are heard by a standing Appellate Body of seven
individuals who sit in divisions of three.'" Although any given appeal is only
formally heard and decided by a division of three Appellate Body members, in
practice all seven members discuss each case in detail."
This system of dispute settlement represents a change from the previous
method of resolving disputes under the WTO's precursor, the GATT. In the GATT
era, there was only one level of dispute settlement, with no ability to appeal. In
addition, panel reports could only be adopted with the consensus of all GATT
signatories, meaning that the losing party to a dispute had the ability to block the
adoption of the report against it. The ability of the losing party to block the
adoption of a report injected a degree of uncertainty in the GATT dispute settlement
system, and undoubtedly led to fewer cases being brought than otherwise might
have. The WTO reverses the consensus presumption extant in the GATT era. In a
significant change of approach, under the WTO, reports are automatically adopted
unless there is consensus not to adopt. Thus, the prevailing party would need to
agree in order for a report not to be adopted. As a result, all reports have been
adopted under the WTO system. This shift gave panel reports more significance
than under the GATT, as such reports can no longer be disregarded at the loser's
option. Furthermore, the WTO introduced new provisions designed to induce
compliance with adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. These modifications
were only possible because they were adopted in tandem with a system of appellate
review-namely the creation of the Appellate Body.
The WTO dispute settlement system is often referred to as being "quasi-
judicial" rather than judicial, because the system does not operate completely
independently.20 Although reports of the WTO Appellate Body and dispute
settlement panels are looked to as interpretations of the WTO Agreements, under
the WTO's structure, formally only the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council have the authority to interpret the covered agreements. 2' The Appellate
17 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 8.5, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU].
1s Appellate Body members are appointed to four-year terms that may be renewed once, for a
maximum time served of eight years. Id. arts. 17.1-17.2.
'9 James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021 (2002).
20 For a characterization of the WTO dispute settlement process as a hybrid system that is not
entirely judicial in nature, see, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate
Body, 38 TEX. INT'L L. J. 469, 470 (2003).
21 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX.2, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] ("The Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the
6 48:1
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Body has indicated that the fact WTO members choose to adopt a given report does
not render such report a definitive interpretation of the provisions at issue (because
this is the province of the Ministerial Conference and General Council).22
Procedurally, the WTO agreement that covers dispute settlement is the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU. The DSU provides for a Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) that "shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt
panel and Appellate Body reports." 23  The General Council regularly (usually
monthly) holds sessions in which it sits as the DSB.24 Thus, it is at DSB meetings
that the reports of (un-appealed) dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body
are raised for consideration by the WTO membership. Unless there is consensus
not to adopt the presented reports, the reports are adopted and then become "part of
the GATT acquis."25
In the case of both panels 26 and the Appellate Body, 27 the DSU explicitly
provides that dissents are permitted, but must be anonymous. While the DSU
provisions address the possibility of dissent in neutral language, the Appellate Body
Working Procedures make it clear that dissent is to be avoided. "[The Appellate
Body and its divisions shall make every effort to take their decisions by consensus.
Where, nevertheless, a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at
issue will be decided by majority vote." 28
B. Nature of the Panels and the Appellate Body
WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body serve functions in
many ways similar to those of a court of first instance and a court of last instance
respectively, but there are important differences. In a domestic context, the lower
courts may have dockets largely filled with unremarkable cases, and only
occasionally face a challenging question of law. In contrast, the court of last
instance may be seen to have the most expertise as it hears far more difficult cases,
and far more frequently, than any lower court. The WTO context is not completely
analogous. WTO members by and large do not initiate formal disputes against one
Multilateral Trade Agreements.").
22 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, at 14-15 (Oct.
4, 1996).
23 DSU art. 2.1.
24 The General Council and the Dispute Settlement Body both comprise all WTO members.
When the General Council acts as the Dispute Settlement Body, it does so with the leadership of a
DSB-specific chairperson. Marrakesh Agreement art. IV.3.
25 DSU art. 16.4 ("Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members,
the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of
its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."); Id art. 17.13 ("An
Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days
following its circulation to the Members."). Appealed panel reports are not considered by the DSB
until the appeal has been completed. Id. art. 16.4.
26 Id art. 14.3 ("Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be
anonymous.").
27 Id. art. 17.11 ("Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the
Appellate Body shall be anonymous.").
28 Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 16, 2010),
Rule 3.2.
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another unless there is a colorable legal claim at issue. With hundreds of disputes
now having been resolved by panels, and over 100 panel reports appealed to and
decided by the Appellate Body, members can "bargain in the shadow of the law."
Accordingly, fewer and fewer "easy" cases are being brought; presumably disputes
with more clear-cut rules violations are being resolved without initiating formal
dispute settlement proceedings. In addition to the cases being of significance even
at the panel stage, WTO dispute settlement also differs from the domestic court
setting in terms of the way in which adjutants are appointed, the types of
institutional support panels and the Appellate Body receive, and the inter-
relationship between the panels and Appellate Body, notwithstanding the
hierarchical nature of the dispute settlement system. These unique aspects of WTO
dispute settlement are explored below.
1. Selection ofPanelists and Appellate Body Members
Although panels are appointed ad hoc, they are not necessarily ill-equipped
to do their job. Panelists are selected in part out of geographic concerns (panelists
are almost never nationals of any country involved in the dispute), but also with
regard to substantive expertise.2 9 As such, there is an attempt to, inter alia, put
individuals with trade remedies experience on panels addressing trade remedies
issues.30 Thus panels are formed in part by looking for technocrats who will
understand the factual as well as the legal issues.
In contrast, prospective Appellate Body members have to undergo a more
political process to get appointed. Candidates are all vetted by the WTO
membership, and de facto, the United States and the European Union have veto
power over nominated individuals. Nominees to the Appellate Body thus have, at a
minimum, extensive meetings with U.S. and E.U. trade officials, in which their
suitability for the position is assessed. When a country is considering who to
nominate, it will be thinking about who can, in effect, be "confirmed" as well as
issues of expertise. Members are, understandably, more concemed about the
Appellate Body upholding their interests than about panels. Panels can be reversed,
but the Appellate Body is the end of the process. Given the somewhat political
nature of the appointments process for Appellate Body members, Appellate Body
members may be selected in part for reasons unrelated to their degree of
international trade expertise. As such, while Appellate Body members obtain
significant experience while serving, not all have extensive relevant expertise at the
time of their initial cases. Furthermore, the Appellate Body must address appeals
covering all of the different covered agreements, and thus even if a member is an
expert in, for example, trade remedies, he or she will still have to hear appeals
relating to intellectual property, services, and so on.
2. Institutional Support for Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body
The expertise differential resulting from having ad hoc panels is further
29 DSU arts. 8.1-8.4.
30 "Trade remedies" refers collectively to antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards.
8 48:1
Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO Dispute Settlement
ameliorated by the institutional support panels and the Appellate Body both receive.
Rather than being supported by recent law graduate clerks as domestic judges might
be, the Appellate Body and the panels have the assistance of a permanent cadre of
experienced trade lawyers. The Appellate Body gets assistance from the Appellate
Body Secretariat; the panels from either the Rules Division or the Legal Affairs
Division, depending on the subject matter of the dispute."' While some lawyers
only spend a year or two in these divisions, both have lawyers that have spent many
years in these positions.
3. Different Strengths within the Hierarchy
Thus, contrary to the relationship between courts at different levels of the
hierarchy in a domestic system, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have a more
complicated relationship. In a way, panelists can be seen as providing a degree of
executive agency-style technocratic expertise as well as serving their judicial
function, while the Appellate Body is more of a combination of judicial and
political/legislative expertise. Here, by "legislative," I do not mean "drafting laws,"
but rather that the Appellate Body is more tied to popular approval and political
considerations (including having the possibility but not the guarantee of
reappointment) than are the panels.
Panels and the Appellate Body therefore can be seen as having
overlapping, but not identical strengths. Panels may have more technocratic
expertise in a given dispute, but the Appellate Body is more cognizant of, and pays
more attention to, the importance of maintaining its legitimacy with WTO
members.
C. WTO Dispute Settlement and Disagreement therein as Dialectic
In assessing disagreement in WTO dispute settlement, we should have in
mind what the purposes are of the reports themselves. The DSU tells us the
"dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system."3 2 However, this cannot be the
sole purpose. If security and predictability were the paramount objectives, this
could be accomplished by determining that in every case the complainant would
succeed. This would lead to perfect predictability, but would not be perceived as
fair or desirable. Thus we must look further for purpose. DSU Article 11 requires
panels to conduct an objective assessment of the matters before them. This would
suggest that each dispute should be given its due, without having been pre-judged,
and without biases or prejudices. In other words, panels should approach their task
of adjudication in good faith. If panels are to make objective assessments, and the
system is to provide security and predictability, marrying these two requires the use
of reasoned decisions rather than the issuance of a result without explanation. And
3 The Rules Division supports panels hearing trade remedies disputes; the Legal Affairs Division
supports panels hearing disputes unrelated to trade remedies. See World Trade Organization, Dispute
Settlement System Training Module: Ch. 3, WTO Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/dispsettlement cbt e/c3stple.htm.
32 DSU art. 3.2.
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indeed, panels do issue (often lengthy) reports that explain their reasoning in detail.
The Appellate Body conducts its work in a similar fashion, also explaining
its reasoning. These processes would further suggest that the intended audience for
the reports extends beyond the parties to a given dispute. The panels are speaking
not just to the parties, but also to the Appellate Body to explain their reasoning.
The Appellate Body in turn is addressing not just the disputants before it, but also
providing guidance to future panelists and divisions of the Appellate Body with
respect to the logic behind its reasoning. Further, the work of the panels and
Appellate Body is ultimately subject to adoption by the entirety of the WTO
membership acting as the Dispute Settlement Body, and thus all WTO members are
a part of the audience.. Lastly, the panels and Appellate Body do not operate in a
Geneva vacuum; they are aware that their decisions will be reviewed by
government officials and other political figures in capitals around the world, as well
as by private interests and NGOs. For all of these reasons, we can view dispute
settlement reports as being directed at a range of audiences, and WTO adjudication
as a type of dialectical process, whereby "opinions communicate to audiences
beyond the immediate parties to the dispute."
The voicing of disagreement in WTO dispute settlement is also a
manifestation of this dialectic. 34 The arguments in favor of dissents identified in
Part II, supra, are equally applicable in the context of WTO dispute settlement.
However, the arguments in opposition are arguably stronger, given the relative
youth of the WTO and the possibility for members to withdraw from the institution
if they are sufficiently dissatisfied. Frequent disagreement in the form of dissents
or panels declining to follow Appellate Body precedent could have destabilizing
effects. Members might question the system's legitimacy if it appeared that
consensus were the exception rather than the rule. Disagreement could also hinder
the ability of a member to comply with a decision (as there might be more
legislative resistance to changing the offending measure if it were seen as a "close
call" or "split decision"). Thus for a panelist or Appellate Body member to dissent,
or for an entire panel to decide not to follow precedent, there must be a good reason
for so doing. Participants in the system are aware of the benefits of consensus, and
thus are unlikely to disagree just to be disagreeable. Instead, the dissents and
failures to follow precedent thus far largely have been intended to extend a dialogue
over proper interpretation. By highlighting points of difference with the majority,
or a previous report as a whole, the adjudicators can be seen as trying to advance a
discussion over the best systemic approach to the given issue. In this way,
disagreement in WTO dispute settlement can be seen as a part of a dialectical
process, and it is in this context that it should be evaluated.
IV. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DISSENT IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
There are several different contexts in which disagreement can be voiced in
WTO dispute settlement. Most of these are horizontal, including: a dissent within a
3 G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 669
(1982) (identifying constitutional adjudication as a dialectical process).
34 In this article, "dialectic" is used in the context of the historical root of the word, meaning
conversation, or dialogue, rather than the more modem Hegelian concept of thesis and antithesis.
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panel; a dissent within a division of the Appellate Body; a panel disagreeing with a
previous panel; and a division of the Appellate Body disagreeing with a previous
Appellate Body report. However, it is also possible to have vertical disagreement,
where a panel declines to follow previous decisions of the Appellate Body. This
Part explores both horizontal and vertical forms of disagreement, with emphasis on
intra-panel and intra-Appellate Body dissent and on panels' disagreement with the
Appellate Body."
A. Revisiting the Question ofDissent Within WTO Dispute Settlement Panels
or the Appellate Body
In my earlier article, I determined that the Appellate Body actively
discourages dissent amongst its members, and observed that panels were also likely
experiencing some pressure not to express disagreement. I argued that the WTO
dispute settlement system has achieved sufficient legitimacy that its standing would
not suffer if the occasional panelist or Appellate Body member expressed the
disagreement that undoubtedly exists in certain cases. I identified a number of
positive purposes that dissents could serve, and demonstrated that the few dissents
that had been written at the panel level had had an impact, as reflected by the
Appellate Body adopting the reasoning of the dissenters in full, in two of the
cases,37 and in part, in a third case.
In 2010, James Flett, a lawyer on the WTO Team of the European
Commission Legal Service, responded to my article, taking issue with my
conclusion that more dissents would be a positive development. Flett identified
fourteen individual opinions at the panel and Appellate Body level, and concluded
that ten of these were "incorrect or unnecessary.""9 He argued that "[i]f the right
persons are in the job, and if the dispute settlement system is functioning correctly,
flexible minds should be able to find common ground"40 and that therefore "it is in
the long-term interests of the WTO that individual opinions remain exceptional."'
Below, I address Flett's arguments that most dissents or separate opinions
are unnecessary or wrong and further explore the utility of separate opinions.
1. Necessity ofDissents/Separate Opinions
I disagree with Flett's contention that separate opinions are unnecessary. It
is valuable for the Appellate Body-and for the WTO membership at large-to
3 The weight to be given by panels to previous panel reports and the Appellate Body to previous
Appellate Body decisions is discussed in IV(C).
36 Lewis, supra note 3.
37 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R (Jul. 13, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States-
Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002).
38 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities, WT/DS I 65/AB/R (Dec. I1, 2000).
3 Flett, supra note 6, at 290.
40 Id. at 313.
41 Id. at 290.
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know whether the panel sees the issue as clear cut or whether it presents interpretive
difficulties. To have the parties' views recorded on the record (which Flett argues
is a sufficient recording of any disagreement on the issues) 42 is not an adequate
substitute because parties are "partisan." Just as courts tend to prefer amicus
submissions from neutral entities rather than from allies of the parties, it should be
more helpful for the Appellate Body to have the views of the neutral panelists than
the views of the governments themselves. The record of these panelists' views is
similarly more useful to other delegations than the views of the parties to the
dispute. Dissents or separate opinions therefore provide information as to points of
disagreement, and this additional information can assist the Appellate Body in
deciding the best logic to apply.4 3
Presumably therefore, panel reports provide a framework for the Appellate
Body to review. While the Appellate Body will review the legal questions de novo,
it is useful to have the panel's work, as at a minimum, a starting point. If the panel
reports give information to the Appellate Body, it would seem that one relevant
piece of information is whether or not the panel saw the interpretive issues as
straightforward ones about which they could all agree. Unanimity thus serves a
signaling function, as does dissent. Without dissents or separate opinions, the
Appellate Body does not have the benefit of recognizing that a given case was
exceptionally difficult to resolve, while another was rather simple. While this may
seem hypothetical, the reality is that the dispute settlement system is being faced
with increasingly challenging disputes. There are unlikely to be many more cases
that are straightforward GATT Article I or GATT Article III violations. There is
enough jurisprudence on these issues that such disputes are less and less likely to
proceed to the panel formation stage. Thus as disputes become increasingly
complicated, it is foreseeable that they will be more challenging to resolve and there
may be more disagreement amongst panelists. Rather than hiding this
disagreement, it should be expressed so that the Appellate Body and delegations
have the benefit of the competing interpretations.
Having all reports be unanimous also dilutes the strength of reports that are
truly the unified view of all the panelists. Using U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
as a reference point, the 9-0 decision in Brown v. Board of Education," which
found segregated schools to be unconstitutional, would not seem as powerful as it
did if the Supreme Court had always issued a single unanimous opinion. But
because there is often a justice, or two, or three or four, who writes separately, the
instances of 9-0 decisions are seen as particularly definitive.
Thus in an adjudicatory system such as the WTO's, with panels and an
Appellate Body, the views expressed in the panel reports can have at least two
functions. The first is to inform the parties and the WTO membership more broadly
as to the panelists' views on the legal issues. The parties can then weigh whether
the logic is persuasive or perhaps subject to challenge. To the extent there is
serious disagreement amongst the panelists, revealing that disagreement gives more
information to the parties in making the decision whether or not to appeal and on
what grounds. A second function of panels is to provide reasoning that the
42 Id. at 314.
43 As evidenced by the fact that the Appellate Body has in fact adopted the dissenter's reasoning
in a number of cases.
4 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Appellate Body can then look to, and weigh along with other proposed
interpretations-of the parties, of amici, and of its own members.
2. Correctness ofDissents and Concurrences
Flett's contention that most of the dissents and concurrences have been
incorrect seems to reflect somewhat circular logic. In Flett's chart characterizing
the separate opinions as of 2010, in instances where the Appellate Body agreed with
a panelist's dissent, Flett has consistently characterized the dissent as correct and
necessary; but where the Appellate Body disagreed with a dissenting panelist, he
has characterized the dissents as incorrect and unnecessary.45 I take issue with this
characterization for a couple of reasons. First, it seems to me to be circular to say if
the Appellate Body disagrees, the dissent must have been wrong, and if it agrees, it
must have been correct.46 This presumes the Appellate Body is always correct
about everything, and always applies the best logic possible. It suggests that the
Appellate Body does not need to see disagreement amongst panelists because it will
reach the right outcome regardless. If this were actually the case, then perhaps
panels should be dispensed with altogether.
Of course no one is arguing that panels should be abolished. But equally
obviously, the Appellate Body is fallible, and does not always use perfect logic in
resolving every issue. Nor do panels. This is in part why having a two-tiered
dispute settlement structure makes sense. Hopefully panels get it right, but if they
don't, hopefully the Appellate Body will catch their errors most of the time. By
virtue of having chosen a two-tiered system, WTO members arguably have already
determined that it is not always possible for panelists to reach the correct outcome.
This would also suggest that a degree of disagreement is to be expected. It would
be odd if panels were always unanimous, but sometimes unanimously right and
other times unanimously wrong.
3. Utility ofPanels
What is the point of having panels? It is not just to screen out cases,
because most panel decisions are appealed. It would seem that one of the functions
is to provide the Appellate Body with tools-in the form of legal reasoning-to
make the Appellate Body's own opinions more sound and carefully reasoned. An
example of this is the evolution in the Appellate Body's reasoning in the zeroing
cases. Its logic has evolved quite substantially since the European Communities-
Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India case
[hereinafter EC-Bed Linen],47 and this appears to be as a direct result of the
arguments raised by the panels subsequently faced with zeroing-related issues. In
45 Flett, supra note 6, at 292-300.
46 While Flett does not argue this explicitly, it is telling that in the fourteen instances examined,
he never expresses disagreement with the Appellate Body's approach, resulting in a perfect confluence
between arguments the Appellate Body rejected being labeled "incorrect" and/or "unnecessary" and
those it accepted being deemed "correct."
47 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-
Type BedLinen from India, WT/DSl41/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter EC-BedLinen].
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addition, the Appellate Body's reasoning in the United States-Laws, Regulations
and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") case [hereinafter
US-Zeroing (EC)]48 was viewed by some as not particularly compelling, mainly
because it seemed to be relying primarily on its own prior decisions49 instead of
applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in interpreting the
Antidumping Agreement." Subsequently, the United States-Measures Relating to
Zeroing and Sunset Reviews panel [hereinafter US-Zeroing (Japan)]I conducted a
more thorough analysis of the issues, applying the VCLT. And thereafter in the
appeal of that report, the Appellate Body employed more persuasive reasoning than
it had in the US-Zeroing (EC) case.52 Thus the panel's suggestion that there was a
better way to conduct the inquiry did lead the Appellate Body to improve its legal
analysis. Therefore, even though the Appellate Body did not adopt the result of the
panel, I would argue that the panel's disagreeing positions were still of value and
were neither wrong nor unnecessary.
The above cases are unusual in that the panels disagreed with previous
Appellate Body decisions and thus forced the Appellate Body to squarely address
the panels' arguments. More commonly, the Appellate Body will largely agree
with the panel. Yet the panel report is still of use to the Appellate Body. It
provides the Appellate Body with reasoning for the panel's decision, which the
Appellate Body can then weigh and consider alongside competing arguments raised
in the appellant's and appellee's submissions, as well as other positions with which
they may be presented. The Appellate Body decision will surely be the better for
having the panel's logic and reasoning as points of reference, regardless of whether
the panel's reasoning is adopted in full, in part, or rejected entirely.
4. Benefits ofSeparate Opinions
In the case of horizontal disagreement, a separate opinion within a panel
may ultimately be persuasive to the Appellate Body. This has been borne out in
practice. In the appeals of the first six cases in which a panelist dissented or wrote
separately, the Appellate Body adopted the full reasoning of the dissenter in two of
the cases, and in part in a third. Thus dissents have had a real impact in WTO
jurisprudence." It also bears noting that while all of the vertical disagreement and
48 Appellate Body Report, United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter US-Zeroing (EC)].
49 See, e.g., WorldTradeLaw.net, Dispute Settlement Commentary: Appellate Body Report,
United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), at
18, (May 27, 2009), http://www.worldtradelaw.net, (describing Appellate Body's reasoning as
"somewhat cursory").
50 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter ADA].
si Panel Report, United States-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/R
(Sept. 20, 2006) [hereinafter US-Zeroing (Japan)].
52 The Appellate Body's reasoning in US-Zeroing (Japan), while an improvement, was still
identified as lacking by some commentators. See, e.g., Tania Voon, The End of Zeroing? Reflections
Following the WTO Appellate Body's Latest Missive, 34 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 211,
225 (2007) (noting that the Appellate Body in Appellate Report, US Zeroing (Japan) conducted little
positive analysis, and instead mainly rebutted the panel on the question of whether simple zeroing was
inconsistent in new shipper and periodic (administrative) reviews, as such, with ADA art. 2.4, 9.3, 9.5).
5 For a discussion of these three cases (EC-Poultry; US-Carbon Steel; and US-Certain EC
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much of the recent horizontal disagreement in WTO dispute settlement has been in
the zeroing context, the cases in which the Appellate Body has adopted the logic of
the dissenters have not involved zeroing or the ADA.54
Even if horizontal disagreement is expressed by an Appellate Body
member-and therefore will not be used as a data point again in that dispute-it can
still have value. Flett identifies the concurring opinion in the Appellate Body's
United States-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology
report [hereinafter US-Continued Zeroing]5 as "correct, but unnecessary."s"
However, in my view the concurrence served a very important function. It was
presumably written by David Unterhalter, who sat on one of the panels that found
zeroing permissible prior to his being appointed to the Appellate Body." This case
followed several others in which panels had taken a different approach to zeroing
(finding it permissible) than the Appellate Body. The panel in this case had
expressed sympathy with the "dissenting panels" but had decided to follow
precedent for systemic reasons. In the concurrence, the Appellate Body member
says, essentially, that the two camps on zeroing will not agree with one another but
it is time to go with the Appellate Body and its precedents for the sake of the
system.' I suspect this will serve a better signal to future panelists that they should
not re-fight the zeroing issue than if there had not been that separate statement.
Indeed, since that Appellate Body report was circulated, no panel or panelist has
argued that a form of zeroing is permissible. And the United States has not
substantively litigated the more recent zeroing cases brought against it; instead, it
has acknowledged that the cases are raising the same legal issues already decided in
earlier cases, and has not attempted to argue the merits."
Flett's view also suggests that panelists who dissent should not do so
unless they are "correct"-meaning the Appellate Body will agree with them on
appeal. But no panelist can know such a thing with any certainty. Indeed,
sometimes panelists agree with one another, and the Appellate Body still disagrees
and reverses the panel. Yet presumably Flett has no quarrel with those panelists-
even though they all "got it wrong." In his article, Flett suggests that high-quality
panelists should be able to reach consensus as to the right answer." While it is of
course important to have good panelists, I do not think that panels that are
overturned, or panelists that dissent, are low-quality panels or panelists. As an
Products), see Lewis, supra note 3, at 928-29.
54 These cases involved the Agreement on Agriculture (EC-Poultry); the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement (US-Carbon Steel); and GATT provisions (US-Certain EC
Products).
ss Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter US-Continued Zeroing].
56 Flett, supra note 6, at 299.
57 The three members of the Appellate Body that form a given division are identified in the
Appellate Body reports. However, pursuant to DSU art. 17.11, "opinions expressed in the Appellate
Body report by individuals on the Appellate Body shall be anonymous." DSU art. 14.3 provides
similarly for panels that "[o]pinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be
anonymous." In the US-Continued Zeroing appeal, the members of the division were David
Unterhalter, Luis Olavo Baptista, and Yuejiao Zhang (presiding).
ss US-Continued Zeroing, supra note 55, at 119-21 (concurring opinion).
s9 See, e.g. Panel Report, United States-Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving
Products from Korea, 1 3.2, WT/DS402/R (Jan. 18, 2011).
6 Flett, supra note 6, at 313.
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example, the Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres panel6'
comprised a remarkable collection of academic and professional expertise-Chang-
fa Lo, Mitsuo Matsushita, and Don McRae. These experts concluded that it did not
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under the GATT Article XX
chapeau for Brazil to have excluded MERCOSUR countries from its ban on
imports of retreaded tyres. The panel found that although Brazil had excluded
MERCOSUR countries from its ban, it had done so in order to comply with a ruling
of the MERCOSUR dispute settlement tribunal, and further that the quantity of
tyres coming from MERCOSUR countries was insignificant. 62 However, the
Appellate Body disagreed that Brazil's reasons excused the exclusion of the
MERCOSUR countries, and found the measure was arbitrary and unjustifiable.6 1
Does that make Matsushita, Lo and McRae bad or low-quality panelists? Did they
not try hard enough? I don't think so.
As cases become increasingly complex, disagreements may result, even
amongst intelligent, diligent, experts in the field. In the zeroing disputes, in which
four panels have found some form of zeroing permissible while the Appellate Body
has steadfastly refused to find any form of zeroing allowable, many if not most of
the panelists had significant expertise in trade remedies, either as academics,
government officials, or both.64 There simply is not always going to be one answer
on which the panel and the Appellate Body will agree. And a panel can act in good
faith and comprise excellent people, and even reach a consensus, but may still reach
a result with which the Appellate Body disagrees. If this is the case with
unanimous panels-and it is-why should it trouble us when a member of a panel
reaches a different view? For it may be then that the Appellate Body sides with the
position taken by one out of three panelists rather than zero out of three panelists. I
do not see this as a problem.
With respect to disagreement within the Appellate Body, the sentiments of
recently retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens provide food for
thought. Stevens wrote the introduction for a 2001 book concerning a scandal in
which justices on the Illinois Supreme Court had been caught taking bribes. One of
the Illinois justices had considered writing a dissenting opinion that would have
revealed the corruption but ultimately did not. In reflecting upon these events
Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 1.6, WT/DS332/R
(June 12, 2007).
62 Id. at paras. 7.271-7.289. The panel did find a different aspect of Brazil's measure-the
importation of used tyres through the use of court injunctions-constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination: Id. at 17.306.
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 225-233,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
64 Examples include eminent professor and international trade expert William Davey, current
Appellate Body member David Unterhalter, and Bruce Cullen, who until recently was New Zealand's
senior representative on the rules committee responsible for a large part of New Zealand's domestic
trade remedies investigations. Because the United States has been the primary respondent in the
zeroing cases, some have characterized these disputes as simply a case of the United States refusing to
fall into line with international practice. While it is true that the United States has continued to defend
zeroing at least in some contexts, it bears noting that there was only one American (Bill Davey)
amongst the twelve panelists who sat on the four panels that upheld some form of zeroing. Further, the
first WTO zeroing case EC-Bed Linen, was brought against the European Communities. Thus while
the United States may be one of the last users and defenders of zeroing, it is not accurate to portray the
practice as having always been a solely American phenomenon, and one which only Americans believe
is consistent with the ADA.
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Stevens said: "[i]f there is disagreement within an Appellate Court about how a
case should be resolved, I firmly believe that the law will be best served by an open
disclosure of that fact, not only to the litigants and their lawyers, but to the public as
well."" This is not only eloquent, but to my mind, correct-and not just for
appellate courts, but for panels of first instance as well.
Dissents by members of the Appellate Body may not have a significant
impact on the parties themselves, or even perhaps on other WTO members.
However, while there is no higher tribunal to attempt to convince with such a
dissent, the dissenting Appellate Body member's words may attract attention from a
broader, external audience. Academics that follow the WTO, government
policymakers and officials, NGOs, and others in civil society may pick up on the
dissenter's point of view and respond to it in various ways. As such, dissents,
particularly by Appellate Body members, can be seen as appealing to an external as
well as an internal audience, and as facilitating a broader participation in the
dialogue."
When I conducted the research for my original article, there had been very
few separate opinions or dissents at either the panel or Appellate Body level of
WTO dispute settlement. In addition, the writings of former members of the
Appellate Body suggested that members worked exceptionally hard to achieve
consensus. Indeed, the impression I came away with was that writing separately,
while technically allowed, was being discouraged.68 In the article, I argued that
there might be good reasons at the inception of a new dispute settlement system to
discourage dissent because unanimity would help cement the legitimacy of the new
mechanism, while dissent might undermine it.69 However, I went on to argue that
after (at that time) ten years of existence, the WTO dispute settlement system was
no longer in any serious jeopardy of being undermined as a result of a few shows of
disagreement amongst panelists. I therefore said that while writing separately
should not be done lightly, it should no longer be affirmatively discouraged.o Fast
forward to the present, and there have now been several more dissents and separate
opinions than there were in 2006. 1 am therefore less concerned now that panelists
are being pressured not to write separately. I do still believe, however, that writing
separately should not be discouraged. To be sure, panelists should try to reach
agreement, and often will be able to do so. However, when there is a genuine
disagreement over treaty interpretation, sometimes compromise may not be
feasible. In such instances, when there are strongly held views that result in
different interpretations of the treaty, the minority viewpoint should be expressed.
This gives the parties and the Appellate Body more information to consider in
determining which the better approach is, and should lead to better reasoned
65 KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN
PAUL STEVENS, Foreword (2001).
66 Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21-23
(2008) (discussing Supreme Court Justices' use of certain dissents to further a dialogue with academics
and others knowledgeable about the substantive issues, democratizing the process of considering
important legal matters).
67 As of 2006, separate opinions had been written in less than six percent of panel reports and less
than two percent of Appellate Body reports. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 899-900.
68 Id. at 903-04.
69 Id. at 904-05.
70 Id. at 930-31.
17
18 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Appellate Body reports. I do not see any harm in airing these differing viewpoints,
and indeed I think it is important to do so in the rare cases when agreement cannot
be reached. In this way, the disagreement can serve a useful function as dialectic,
rather than being suppressed.
B. The Zeroing Cases as Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement
For the reasons stated above, I disagree with Flett's premises and stand by
my initial views with respect to horizontal dissent in WTO dispute settlement.
However, recent developments reveal new and challenging issues that also must be
considered. First, while the overall number of dissents is still low, it is noteworthy
that most of these separate opinions have been issued in cases involving issues
relating to zeroing. Significant as these dissents are, they do not reflect the true
level of disagreement over zeroing. Before examining the data, a brief explanation
of zeroing is in order.
1. What is Zeroing, and Why is it so Controversial?
The practice of "zeroing" has engendered a substantial amount of
controversy in WTO dispute settlement. There has been far more disagreement-
both horizontally and vertically-over issues relating to zeroing than any other.
While analyzing-or even identifying in detail-the competing interpretations
presented in the relevant panel and Appellate Body reports is beyond the scope of
this article," a brief introduction to what zeroing is and why issues relating to
zeroing have caused so much controversy may be useful.
In an antidumping investigation, a domestic agency (in the case of the
United States, this is the Department of Commerce) determines whether dumping
has occurred by comparing prices in the importing country with the "normal value"
of the like product. Normal value will often be prices for the product in the home
market. If the product is being sold in the importing country for less than it is sold
for in the originating market, it is deemed to be dumped and duties may be imposed
on future imports of the product. Zeroing is a methodology used in calculating
dumping margins. When zeroing is not used, sales that are made at higher prices in
the importing market than in the home market are assigned a negative dumping
margin and can offset any unprofitable sales assigned a positive margin. However,
when zeroing is used, sales made at higher prices than in the home market are
simply treated as not dumped, and given a zero dumping margin. Thus when
zeroing is used, profitable sales cannot be used to offset unprofitable sales, with the
result that zeroing generally results in higher dumping margins. The ADA
contemplates three potential ways to compare prices in the importing country with
normal value:
[T]he existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall
normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average
normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export
n Such an analysis is however the subject of an ongoing project.
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transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a
transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted
average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions
[under certain elaborated circumstances] . . . .72
Thus it is possible to employ zeroing in each of these three methodologies:
weighted average to weighted average comparisons (WA-WA), transaction to
transaction comparisons (T-T), and weighted average to transaction comparisons
(WA-T). Furthermore, antidumping cases have numerous phases, including: the
original investigation; annual reviews of those already found to have been dumping;
sunset reviews when the agency is determining whether to terminate an
antidumping order; and new shipper reviews for exporters not investigated in the
original investigation. It is possible to employ zeroing in each of these phases as
well. There are thus many different contexts in which it is possible to use zeroing.
The Appellate Body has taken an incremental approach to zeroing, evaluating the
applications of the methodology as challenged, but declining to make a sweeping
pronouncement that zeroing could never be permitted. As a result, there have been
a large number of challenges to different uses of zeroing in a variety of contexts.
Zeroing is deeply unpopular internationally because, as mentioned, it
generally leads to the imposition of higher antidumping duty rates. However, there
has been serious disagreement over the extent to which the WTO ADA prohibits
the use of zeroing.
2. Degrees ofDisagreement over Zeroing
This section will illustrate the degree of disagreement over zeroing, and the
horizontal and vertical forms which that disagreement has taken. Table One
illustrates the voting patterns in the six most substantive zeroing cases, reflecting
that out of the six panels, two featured dissents, meaning that two out of eighteen
panelists wrote dissenting opinions.
Table One
Zeroing Panel # of Panelists in the # of Panelists in the
Majority Minority (= dissents)
EC-Bed Linen 3 0
Softwood Lumber V 2 1
US-Zeroing (EC) 2 1
Softwood Lumber V 3 0
(21.5)
US-Zeroing (Japan) 3 0
US-Stainless Steel 3 0
(Mexico)
Total 16 2
72 ADA art. 2.4.2.
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However, if we instead look at the substance of the panel reports, the data,
set forth in Tables Two and Three, looks quite different. In 2001, in the EC-Bed
Linen case, the panel and Appellate Body both found zeroing impermissible. That
case only considered the context of zeroing as applied in comparisons of weighted
averages of transactions with other weighted averages of transactions (WA-WA),
and did not opine with respect to the permissibility of zeroing in the context of
other types of comparisons. However, one could have reasonably taken the view
that, having found zeroing impermissible in the WA-WA context, the Appellate
Body was likely to find it impermissible in other contexts as well. Nonetheless, in
the five panels that came after the EC-Bed Linen case was decided, every panel
had at least one member finding a form of zeroing permissible. Four of the five
panels had a majority of members permitting zeroing, and three of the panels were
unanimous that zeroing was permissible, at least in some contexts. While
subsequent panels have largely followed the Appellate Body's decision with respect
to zeroing in the WA-WA context, they have been nearly unanimous in their view
that zeroing is otherwise permissible. Furthermore, the Appellate Body reversed
each of the four panels that found zeroing permissible. Thus when the later panels
reached their decisions, they already knew the Appellate Body had rejected zeroing
in very similar contexts.
Table Two
Zeroing Panel # of Panelists finding # of Panelists finding
any form of zeroing all zeroing at issue
permitted prohibited
EC-Bed Linen 0 3
Softwood Lumber V 1 2
US-Zeroing (EC) 2 1
Softwood Lumber V 3 0
(21.5)
US-Zeroing (Japan) 3 0
US-Stainless Steel 3 0
(Mexico)
Total 12 6
Finding zeroing permitted in any context after the EC-Bed Linen
report can be seen as vertical disagreement with, or dissent from, previous
Appellate Body decisions.
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Table Three
Zeroing Panel Zeroing in WA-WA Zeroing in WA-T or
comparisons T-T contexts
permitted? permitted?
EC-Bed Linen 3-0 no n/a
Softwood Lumber V 2-1 no n/a
US-Zeroing (EC) 3-0 no 2-1 yes
Softwood Lumber V n/a 3-0 yes
(21.5)
US-Zeroing (Japan) 3-0 no 3-0 yes
US-Stainless Steel 3-0 no 3-0 yes
(Mexico)
Total 14 no, 1 yes 11 yes, 1 no
Finding zeroing permitted in any context after the EC-Bed Linen
report can be seen as vertical disagreement with, or dissent from, previous
Appellate Body decisions.
Therefore looking at panelists writing separately no longer tells the full
story. We must look to the substance of the reports in order to recognize that even
in cases with unanimous decisions-where no dissents would have been added to
Flett's statistics-there has in fact been disagreement." Yet because the
disagreement has been with the Appellate Body and not within the panels, and due
to the fact that the panels themselves have been united in their views, such
decisions are unlikely to be counted as dissents.74 However, there is little difference
between the dissent in the United States-Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada panel report [hereinafter Softwood Lumber V], 7 and
the unanimous panel decision in US-Zeroing (Japan). In both instances, views
73 If we look at the panel reports in United States Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, 5.11-5.14, WT/DS264/RW
(Apr. 3, 2006), (panel: Ali, Welge, Makuc) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber V (21.5)]; US-Zeroing
(Japan), supra note 51, 1.6 (panel: Unterhalter, Farbenbloom and Buencamino); and United States-
Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 1.6, WT/DS344/R (Dec. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter US-Stainless Steel (Mexico)] (panel: Cullen, Dumont, Blumberg), we see that all three
panels were unanimous, so there were no separate opinions or dissents. But all nine panelists found
that certain forms of zeroing were permissible. In addition, in United States-Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), 1.6, WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Panel Report, US-Zeroing (EC)], the members of the panel had found two to one that
zeroing was permissible (Davey, Falconer, Beseler). In the case of the US-Zeroing (Japan) and, US-
Stainless Steel (Mexico) disputes, the panel reports came out after the Appellate Body's report in US-
Zeroing (EC) and were thus directly contrary to a prior Appellate Body decision. Flett measures these
cases as resulting in the one dissent and one concurrence from US-Zeroing (EC). But in reality, in
these four cases, eleven panelists found forms of zeroing permissible while only one panelist found that
it was not. So in terms of reaching a consensus, the panelists did reach a consensus. But the Appellate
Body disagreed with that commonly held view.
74 This phenomenon has, in the WTO context, only occurred (to the best of my knowledge) in the
zeroing cases. Although there have been other isolated incidents of panels failing to conform to
previous Appellate Body practice, this has appeared to be more a matter of carelessness rather than
deliberate disagreement.
7 Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada,
TT 9.1-9.24, WT/DS264/R (Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber V].
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are being expressed that diverge from that of the Appellate Body with respect to the
permissibility of some aspect of zeroing. And it is for this reason that in this article
I term these panels "dissenting panels" and discuss their actions alongside a
consideration of the practice of dissent within panels. Dissenting panels present an
issue of more systemic importance than whether panels reach a unanimous outcome
or not, particularly in the case of the US-Zeroing (Japan) panel and the United
States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico panel
[hereinafter US-Stainless Steel (Mexico)], which reached their decisions explicitly
disagreeing with previous Appellate Body precedent. It should not be of great
concern whether panelists disagree with each other from time to time. But when
panels disagree with the Appellate Body, they are disagreeing vertically, and this
presents a more nuanced issue.
C. "Dissenting Panels "-Disagreement Between Panels
and the Appellate Body
One might argue that panels that dissent really present an issue of
precedent, not dissents, and might further comment that unanimous decisions
should not be called dissents. With respect to the first potential objection, to be
sure, this phenomenon raises issues of precedent. And with respect to the second, it
is of course the case that "dissent" generally refers to the minority opinion or
opinions within a single judgment. However, in the line of WTO cases addressing
the issue of zeroing, several panels have included panelists who have disagreed
with the Appellate Body's reasoning on the legal question at issue. In one of these
cases, only one panelist out of three held this view, and thus was truly a dissenter.7 6
In another case, two panelists determined the zeroing at issue should be permitted.
They were therefore in the majority, yet were disagreeing with previous Appellate
Body jurisprudence. And then in the following three cases, all the panelists found
zeroing permitted," notwithstanding Appellate Body precedents to the contrary.
The panelists arguing that zeroing is permissible were sometimes in the majority
and sometimes in the minority within their respective panels, but each was always
disagreeing with the Appellate Body. I therefore see the panels that did so in
unison as uniformly dissenting-just dissenting against the Appellate Body, not
their colleagues. Of course, I acknowledge that formally these panels were
unanimous as they did not have any internal disagreement; however, for purposes
of this article, I shall refer to them as the "dissenting panels." While the "dissenting
panels" require considerations of precedent not implicated by the "normal" dissents
occurring within panels, all of these cases involve a level of disagreement panelists
have articulated with respect to the Appellate Body's zeroing jurisprudence. It
therefore seems appropriate to consider the phenomena of disagreement within
panels and of disagreement between panels and the Appellate Body as all part of
one picture.
This article does not seek to evaluate the substantive differences between
76 Softwood Lumber V, supra note 75, 9.1.
n Panel Report, US-Zeroing (EC), supra note 73, T 9.14.
Softwood Lumber V (21.5), supra note 73; US-Zeroing (Japan), supra note 51, T 7.259; US-
Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 73, T 7.148.
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the panels and Appellate Body, 9 but rather to examine the phenomenon of this
unusual type of disagreement. This section reviews the jurisprudence regarding the
weight to be given to previous decisions of the system's past and present
adjudicators, including the views of one of the dissenting panels and the Appellate
Body's response. As a general matter under international law, the decisions and
rulings of dispute settlement tribunals do not have stare decisis effect."o Similarly,
there is no stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement. Dispute settlement reports of
panels and the Appellate Body, if adopted, bind the parties to the dispute at hand,
but do not bind other WTO members more broadly. However, just because reports
are not binding on those not party to the dispute does not mean those decisions do
not have precedential impact. To the contrary, panels and the Appellate Body
routinely reference and apply previous reports." Thus there is no de jute system of
precedent, but de facto, previous decisions are generally followed.82
In the WTO context, there are several types of decisions which could be
relied upon by later WTO panels or the Appellate Body. These are: i) unadopted
GATT panel reports; ii) adopted GATT panel reports; iii) adopted WTO panel
reports, and iv) adopted reports of the WTO Appellate Body. Each of these will be
considered briefly below. 83
1. Unadopted GATT Panel Reports
Under the GATT, there was a single level of dispute settlement, in the form
of ad hoc panels. Pursuant to GATT rules, panel reports would only have a binding
7 For a critique of the Appellate Body's earlier zeroing jurisprudence, see Roger P. Alford,
Reflections on US Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196 (2006).
8o See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, TS
No. 993 at 25, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179 ("The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case."); Olav A. Haazen, Precedent in the World Court, 38
HARV. INT'L L.J. 587, 588 (1997) (rule of stare decisis does not apply to the International Court of
Justice); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE
83 (1998).
81 JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 173-177 (2006). For an extensive discussion of the WTO and precedent,
see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The
Power of the Past: Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873 (2001). Disregarding precedent is unusual, but not unheard of, even in
systems where precedents have stare decisis effect. Recently Loudoun County, Virginia District Court
Judge Dean Worcester announced in an immigration proceeding that he would not follow a January
2011 ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had ruled that judges could not revisit
certain immigrant convictions. Judge Worcester indicated that following the Supreme Court's ruling
would lead to a constitutional violation going unremedied. See Tom Jackman, Londoun Judge Defies
Va. Supreme Court, Continues to Reopen Immigrants' Cases, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/06/AR2011020603133.html.
82 JACKSON, supra note 80, at 83 (noting that "there clearly is a de facto precedential effect
operating, albeit not strictly.").
83 See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and Awards, Status of Panel and
Appellate Body Reports, S.8.1-2, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/
repertory e/s8_e.htm#S.8.1 (collection of more detailed excerpts from the relevant cases and
authorities discussing applicability of previous GATT precedent. This site has not been updated to
reflect the relevant developments from the past few years; these later cases are discussed in detail in
this article.).
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effect on the parties to the dispute if all GATT members agreed to the adoption of
the report. Because any one member could block the adoption of a report, the
losing party to a dispute sometimes did exactly this, resulting in a number of
unadopted panel reports. 4
In an early WTO appeal, the WTO Appellate Body had the occasion to
consider what weight, if any, to give to unadopted GATT panel reports. It stated:
"we agree with the Panel's conclusion ... that unadopted panel reports 'have no
legal status in the GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed
through decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members.'
Likewise, we agree that 'a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the
reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be relevant.""'
2. Adopted GATT Panel Reports
In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [hereinafter Japan-Alcohol],
the Appellate Body made clear that adopted GATT panel reports are to be taken
into account by WTO panels and the Appellate Body:
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are
often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate
expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into
account where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not
binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the
parties to that dispute. In short, their character and their legal status have
not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement.
3. Adopted WTO Panel Reports
In the Japan-Alcohol case cited above, the Appellate Body further
clarified that both adopted GATT and WTO panel reports should be treated as a
84 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 ILM 1594, 1620 (1991); Report of the Panel, United States-
Procurement of a Sonar Mapping System, GPR.DSI/R (Apr. 23, 1992); Report of the Panel, United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, (unadopted panel report, June 16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839, 899
(1994); Report of the Panel, European Communities-Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R (unadopted
panel report, Feb. I1, 1994). The ability for a party to block adoption of a panel report that went
against it was seen as a significant flaw in the GATT dispute settlement system. There was a
significant increase in unadopted reports in the final years of the GATT. William J. Davey, The WTO
Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L EcON. L 17, 48 (2005). One of the most
widely praised features of the WTO dispute settlement system is the change to a reverse consensus
model, whereby every report is automatically adopted unless all WTO members-including the
prevailing party to a dispute-agree that the report should not be adopted.
85 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1, 14-15, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSl l/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcohol]. On occasion, the
Appellate Body has made reference to unadopted GATT reports. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Conditions for the Granting Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, T
13, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004); discussion in Daniel H. Erskine, The US.-EC Dispute over
Custom Matters: Trade Facilitation, Customs Unions, and the Meaning of WTO Obligations, 18 FLA. J.
INT'L. L 423, 461-62 & nn.240-242 (2006).
6 Japan-Alcohol, supra note 85.
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part of the GATT acquis. It also clarified that neither adopted GATT panel reports
nor adopted WTO panel reports constitute "subsequent practice" for purposes of
Article 31 of the VCLT, thus confirming the lack of formal stare decisis in the
WTO context."
With respect to these first three categories of decisions, adherence would
either be horizontal or vertical (top-down). None of these categories has caused
much difficulty. Panels generally refer to previous GATT panel and WTO panel
reports where relevant, but the failure to do so has not raised major concerns. The
main source of friction that has arisen derives from the failure to adhere vertically,
from the bottom up. This scenario is discussed below.
4. Adopted WTO Appellate Body Reports
Unsurprisingly, the Appellate Body indicated early in its existence that
previous Appellate Body reports are also an important part of the GATT acquis,
and likewise give rise to legitimate expectations among WTO members.8  The
Appellate Body subsequently stated that "following the Appellate Body's
conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but is what would be
expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same." 9
The Appellate Body provided further guidance on this issue following the
panel report in US -Stainless Steel (Mexico), in which the panel declined to follow
two previous Appellate Body decisions" with respect to the (im)permissibility of
*91
simple zeroing.
On the appeal from the panel decision, the E.U., participating as a third
party, urged the Appellate Body to adopt a rule requiring panels to follow previous
Appellate Body decisions:
Although the European Communities acknowledges that case law can
change if there are cogent reasons for such a change, such a change could
not be justified solely on the basis of a disagreement by the hierarchically
lower body with the reasoning of the hierarchically higher body in the
WTO dispute settlement system. The European Communities therefore
requests the Appellate Body to make it unambiguous that panels are not
" Id. (explaining that adopted panel reports "are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties.").
88 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, 15 107-109, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22,
2001).
89 Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Reviews of Anti-dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, 188, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Nov. 29, 2004).
9 US-Zeroing (EC), supra note 48; Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Relating
to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R, (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter US-Zeroing (Japan)
(A B) ].
9 This is the most controversial of the "dissenting panel" decisions, because the Appellate
Body's position had already been made quite clear in response to the earlier panel reports. See
Sungjoon Cho, A WTO Panel Openly Rejects the Appellate Body's "Zeroing" Case Law March II,
2008; Update: The Appellate Body Has Reversed the Panel's Departure from the Zeroing
Jurisprudence, ASIL Insights (June 6, 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights080311.cfm (characterizing
the panel as "rebellious" and describes the report as "highly controversial.").
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only expected, but also obliged, to follow Appellate Body findings. 9 2
The Appellate Body reiterated its previous statements regarding past
Appellate Body decisions (described above), and then gave additional guidance,
stating that "[e]nsuring 'security and predictability" in the dispute settlement
system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent
reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way
in a subsequent case.""
It is an open issue whether the Appellate Body in US-Stainless Steel
(Mexico) intended for its "cogent reasons" language to mean that panels can diverge
from previous Appellate Body jurisprudence, or if by "adjudicatory body" it
intended only to authorize horizontal disregard for precedent-i.e. solely that panels
can diverge from previous panels, and that the Appellate Body can diverge from
previous divisions of the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body had the opportunity
to clarify this in the subsequent US-Continued Zeroing case, but declined to do so.
In that case, the panel indicated that it shared certain concerns raised by the panel in
US-Stainless Steel (Mexico),94 ("we have generally found the reasoning of earlier
panels on these issues to be persuasive."") but ultimately elected to follow the
relevant Appellate Body precedents, citing the goals of security and predictability
(DSU art. 3.2) and the desirability of prompt resolution of disputes (DSU art. 3.3).96
Although the panel followed previous Appellate Body findings with
respect to the type of zeroing at issue, the European Conununities nonetheless
raised what it styled as a "conditional appeal," arguing that:
if the Panel Report is construed as finding that a panel can invoke "cogent
reasons" for departing from previous Appellate Body findings on the same
issue of legal interpretation (paragraphs 7.180 and 7.182 of the Panel
Report) then the European Communities requests the Appellate Body to
modify or reverse those findings and complete the analysis, for all the
reasons set out by the Appellate Body in its report in US-Stainless Steel
from Mexico. The European Communities considered that a panel may
invoke "cogent reasons" in order to depart from previous panel findings;
but only the Appellate Body can invoke "cogent reasons" in order to depart
92 Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, 149 (Apr. 30, 2008), (citations omitted).
9 Id. at 1 160. The "cogent reasons" criteria has also been applied by the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): "[the Appeals Chamber] should
follow its previous decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests
of justice". Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski (Lasva River Valley), Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal
Judgement, 107 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
94 Panel Report, United States-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 1
7.168, 17.181, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Panel Report, US-Continued Zeroing].
9 Id atT7.169.
96 Id. at 7.182. For further discussion of the US Stainless Steel (Mexico) and United States
Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology cases, see Recent International
Decision: International Trade Law-Role of Dispute Settlement Decisions in WTO Law-WTO
Appellate Body Re-affirms WTO Inconsistency of "Zeroing."-Appellate Body Report, United States-
Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008), 122
HARV. L. REV. 1993 (2009) [hereinafter Recent International Decision].
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from previous Appellate Body findings.7
The United States argued that the Appellate Body should deny the
"conditional appeal," because the European Communities "is essentially asking the
Appellate Body to assess the consistency of the Panel Report with the Appellate
Body's dicta in US-Stainless Steel (Mexico)."8 For the United States, the Panel
"was bound neither by the findings, nor the dicta in a prior, unrelated dispute".99
The United States further argued that "the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council have the exclusive authority to adopt binding interpretations of the covered
agreements under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement."100 For the United States,
treating prior reports as binding outside the scope of the original dispute would add
to the obligations of WTO Members, inconsistent with both Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of
the DSU.
The Appellate Body declined to clarify this legal question. It determined
that the panel had not been clear in its reasoning, such that it was uncertain whether
the panel had in fact intended to state that panels can diverge from previous
Appellate Body findings. Since the panel in fact did not depart from the previous
Appellate Body decisions on point, the Appellate Body determined that there was
no need for it to resolve this aspect of the European Communities' appeal.'0 '
It is thus clear that at a minimum, panels must follow Appellate Body
precedents absent "cogent reasons." What is not clear is what constitutes "cogent
reasons", nor whether the EU is correct that panels must always follow the
Appellate Body, and it is only in the context of horizontal rather than vertical
disagreement where "cogent reasons" come into play. The following Part explores
these issues.
V. SHOULD PANELS BE ABLE TO DIVERGE FROM PREVIOUS APPELLATE BODY
JURISPRUDENCE?
This is the question the Appellate Body left unanswered in US-Continued
Zeroing. In the following sections, I attempt to address this question both as an
interpretive matter and as a normative one.
In examining this issue, it bears noting that precedent is not a unitary
concept. While some international tribunals have a tradition of following precedent
that approaches stare decisis (e.g. the European Court of Justice), others take a less
rigid stance.102 Thus there is not a common approach that can be pointed to in
9 Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under
Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States-Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/11 (Nov. 10, 2008); appended as Annex I to Panel
Report, US-Continued Zeroing, supra note 94.
98 Appellee Submission ofthe United States ofAmerica: United States-Continued Existence and
Application ofZeroing Methodology, 169, AB-2008-1 /DS350 (Dec. 1, 2008).
9 Id. at 1l69.
'00 Id.
"o1 US-Continued Zeroing, supra note 55, 365.
102 John Jackson has suggested that precedent should therefore be viewed as a "multi-layered
concept" with a variety of approaches existing in the international legal arena. JACKSON, supra note 81,
at 175.
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international law generally. That said, the phenomenon of vertical disagreement
recently experienced by the WTO is not unique amongst international tribunals.o3
A. Guiding Provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and Key
Interpretive Principles
Panels (and the Appellate Body) must conduct their work pursuant to, and
in light of, the DSU. There are three provisions of the DSU that are particularly
relevant to the question of whether panels may decline to follow Appellate Body
precedent-Articles 3.2,'0 11,"" and 19.2.106
Article 3.2 provides for clarifying provisions "in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law." The Appellate Body
has made it clear from its earliest reports that this language refers to Articles 31107
and 320 of the VCLT.'"
It is therefore necessary to reconcile DSU provisions in light of the VCLT.
The drafting history of the VCLT reflects an intention to apply a textual method of
treaty interpretation, rather than "subjective intentions" or a teleological
1o3 For example, the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunals have expressed
(in case law) a rule that the trial chambers must follow the Appeals Chambers decisions, but
nonetheless there are examples of trial chambers declining to do so. See generally Xavier Tracol, The
Precedent of Appeals Chambers Decisions in the International Criminal Tribunals, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 67 (2004).
DSU art. 3.2 ("The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. . [Ilt serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. . . .[T]he
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements").
'os Id. art. II ("[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements .... ).
06 Id. art. 19.2 ("In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements").
107 Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards fbr Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, at 16, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). For present purposes, the most relevant
parts of Article 31 provide:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes ....
tos Japan-Alcohol, supra note 85, at 10. Article 32 of the VCLT provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
1'0 The words "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" were chosen to
reflect that these selected rules within the VCLT have become customary international law, and as such
are binding even on WTO members that (like the United States) are not signatories to the Convention.
See, e.g., Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 17, 18-19 (2002).
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approach.no Thus the goal is to determine the "objective" intent of the parties, as
expressed in the text.'
The zeroing cases reveal a tension between the objective of providing
security and predictability in Article 3.2, and the mandate for panels to conduct an
objective assessment in Article 11. If there is a clash between two provisions
however, one could argue that the more specific provision-Article 11-should
prevail over the more general one-Article 3.2- pursuant to the principle of lex
specialis.112 However, in general, an agreement should be read harmoniously if it is
possible to do so."' We must therefore determine whether it is possible for a panel
to satisfy both provisions if it declines to follow precedent.
Article 3 1(1) of the VCLT is of particular importance to this inquiry: we
must examine the relevant DSU articles in the context of the entire DSU, and in
light of the object and purpose of the treaty. In the US-Continued Zeroing case,
the Appellate Body clarified that:
The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32 are to
be followed in a holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is engaged so
as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious and coherent and fits
comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render the treaty provision
legally effective.114
It went on to indicate that:
We further note that the rules and principles of the Vienna Convention
cannot contemplate interpretations with mutually contradictory results.
Instead, the enterprise of interpretation is intended to ascertain the proper
meaning of a provision; one that fits harmoniously with the terms, context,
and object and purpose of the treaty. The purpose of such an exercise is
110 See discussion in Lennard, supra note 109, at 20-22 (detailing International Law Commission
commentary on the drafting of the VCLT).
11 Id. at 21. It should be noted that while the Appellate Body usually adopts a highly textual
approach to treaty interpretation, this is not always the case. For example, in the United States-
Shrimp case, the Appellate Body notably took an evolutionary approach to the meaning of the term
"exhaustible natural resources" in Article XX(g) of the GATT Agreement. It interpreted the phrase to
include sea turtles, even though at the time of the GATT's drafting in 1947, "exhaustible natural
resources" would have been understood to refer to non-living resources such as oil and extractable
minerals. For a discussion of this issue, see Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law
as Practiced by WTO Courts, 102 AMER. J. INT'L L. 421, 445 (2008).
112 There may be some interpretive difficulties with applying lex specialis within a WTO
Agreement however. First, this principle is not found in the applicable VCLT provisions. And second,
the explicit use of lex specialis in the interpretive note to Annex IA (providing that this principle
applies in case of a conflict between two different WTO Agreements) may suggest that the lack of
reference to lex specialis in other contexts means it is unavailable in those contexts. See, e.g., Lennard,
supra note 109, at 71-72. It is arguable that the Appellate Body endorsed a lex specialis approach in
the EC-Bananas case (European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of
Bananas (EC-Bananas), T 204, WT/DS27/AB/R, (Sept. 9, 1997)), in indicating the panel should have
first looked to the more specific of two provisions, but it is also possible the Appellate Body was
merely making a point about judicial economy. See Lennard, supra note 109, at 70-71.
" See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products, 81, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 549, WT/DS267/AB/R, (Mar. 3, 2005).
114 US-Continued Zeroing, supra note 55, 268.
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therefore to narrow the range of interpretations, not to generate conflicting,
competing interpretations. Interpretative tools cannot be applied
selectively or in isolation from one another. It would be a subversion of
the interpretative disciplines of the Vienna Convention if application of
those disciplines yielded contradiction instead of coherence and harmony
among, and effect to, all relevant treaty provisions."'
The dissenting panels have particularly emphasized their obligations under
Article 11 to perform an objective assessment. The US-Stainless Steel (Mexico)
panel stated:
7.105 This indicates that even though the DSU does not require WTO
panels to follow adopted panel or Appellate Body reports, the Appellate
Body de facto expects them to do so to the extent that the legal issues
addressed are similar. We also note, however, that the panel in US-
Zeroing (Japan), while recognizing the need to provide security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system through the development of
a consistent line of jurisprudence on similar legal issues, drew attention to
the provisions of Articles 11 and 3.2 of the DSU and implied that the
concern over the preservation of a consistent line of jurisprudence should
not override a panel's task to carry out an objective examination of the
matter before it through an interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions
in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. We also share the concern raised by the panel in US-
Zeroing (Japan) regarding WTO panels' obligation to carry out an
objective examination of the matter referred to them by the DSB.
7.106 After a careful consideration of the matters discussed above, we have
decided that we have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of
reasoning developed by the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-
consistency of simple Zeroing in periodic reviews. We are cognizant of
the fact that in two previous cases, US-Zeroing (EC) and US-Zeroing
(Japan), the decisions of panels that found simple Zeroing in periodic
reviews to be WTO-consistent were reversed by the Appellate Body and
that our reasoning set out below is very similar to these panel decisions. In
light of our obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to carry out an
objective examination of the matter referred to us by the DSB, however,
we have felt compelled to depart from the Appellate Body's approach for
the reasons explained below.
In contrast, the Appellate Body has focused more heavily on DSU Article
3.2. In its report in the US-Stainless Steel (Mexico) case, it noted:
"' Id. at 1 273 (citation omitted). See also Bryan Mercurio and Mitali Tyagi, Treaty
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working
Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 275, 303-04 (2010) (noting that by requiring a holistic exercise, the
Appellate Body is staying true to the textual approach favored by the VCLT drafters, rather than
preferencing a teleological approach-which would emphasize "object and purpose" above and beyond
the other criteria).
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In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the
Appellate Body have distinct roles to play. .. The Panel's failure to follow
previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues
undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of
jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and obligations under the covered
agreements as contemplated under the DSU. Clarification, as envisaged in
Article 3.2 of the DSU, elucidates the scope and meaning of the provisions
of the covered agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. While the application of a
provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes
place, the relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body
reports is not limited to the application of a particular provision in a
specific case.' 6
The Appellate Body seems to preference Article 3.2 over Article 11.
However, the general objective of providing security and predictability must be
read in light of the other provisions of the DSU, including Articles 11 and 19.2. If
taken to its logical extreme, security and predictability could be accomplished by
following the precept that panels will always find in favor of the complainant. But
this would seem to strip the "objective assessment" language of Article 11 of its
meaning. In order to balance these provisions, it may be useful to apply the good
faith obligation of Article 3 1(1) of the VCLT."' If a panel is acting in good faith in
conducting its objective assessment, then there should be no complaints that the
outcome undermines security and predictability. Further, providing security and
predictability cannot come at the expense of conducting an objective assessment or
depriving members of their due process or other rights to have their disputes
considered in full.
Notwithstanding the Appellate Body's emphasis on Article 3.2, and the
panels' focus on Article 11, it would seem these provisions can be read
harmoniously and allow for a panel to disagree with the Appellate Body. The
panel's objective assessment will require it to consider any relevant precedents, and
to weigh any systemic effects a contrary decision is likely to have. Most panels, in
conducting their objective assessments, will and do choose to follow Appellate
Body precedents. It will only be in unusual cases when a panel meets these
prerequisites yet nonetheless determines it must disagree."' However, assuming the
panel undertakes this exercise in good faith, its determination that it should not
follow precedent should not be interpreted as either a breach of Article 11 or Article
3.2. In assessing this situation, we must remain mindful of Article 19.2, and the
116 US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 73, 1 161.
117 For a discussion of the good faith obligation, see Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB. J. INT'L L. 339 (2006); see also MARION PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, GOOD FAITH
INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2006).
1.. Because this circumstance will be the exception rather than the norm, it will not undermine
security and predictability. Instead, if a panel feels strongly that the Appellate Body's jurisprudence is
not workable, this may lead the Appellate Body to, if not change its answer, refine its approach. This
has in fact happened in the evolution of the Appellate Body's approach to the zeroing cases. Although
the outcomes all prohibit zeroing, the Appellate Body's reasoning and logic is much improved in its
later decisions.
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potential for infringing upon members' rights. At a minimum, there does not
appear to be anything in the relevant DSU or VCLT provisions to support a textual
interpretation that panels are required to follow Appellate Body precedent.
B. Should panels be precluded from disagreeing with the Appellate Body?
As a normative matter, there are arguments in favor and against the
phenomenon of panels disagreeing with the Appellate Body.
Panels that diverge from previous decisions are arguably not acting in
accordance with the objective of the dispute settlement system to provide security
and predictability of the multilateral trading system."' If disputants have no
assurance that panels will follow the logic previously applied by the Appellate
Body, it injects a degree of uncertainty into the dispute settlement process. While
the final outcome is arguably no less certain-because the Appellate Body is highly
likely to reverse any panel finding that contradicts previous Appellate Body
determinations-the possibility of a "rogue" panel may make the length of the
proceedings less predictable. If a WTO member feels the legal issue involved in a
dispute has clearly been resolved by the Appellate Body in a previous dispute, it
might logically conclude that a panel would decide in its favor, and that the
unsuccessful responding WTO member might well decline to appeal such a panel's
ruling. However, if panels routinely disregard previous Appellate Body
determinations, then the trajectory of a case may be more likely to lead to an
appeal.
On the other hand, there are reasons why we should be cautious in
constraining what panels can do. Under the Appellate Body's jurisprudence to date,
panels have already been instructed that they are expected to follow Appellate Body
decisions where the legal issues are the same as those that have been considered
previously. In addition, panels are assisted in their work by the staff of the WTO
Secretariat.120 Staff lawyers from the Rules Division assist in proposing panelists
and providing assistance to panels addressing disputes in so-called "rules" cases
(i.e., those relating to antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures and
safeguards), while the Legal Affairs Division assists in proposing panelists and
supporting panels in non-rules cases arising under the covered agreements. 2' Thus
panels, even though appointed on an ad hoc basis, are well-informed as to how
previous panels and divisions of the Appellate Body have resolved any similar legal
issues.'22 Furthermore, it is eminently predictable that if a panel were to go against
previous rulings, the Appellate Body would almost certainly reverse it. Thus any
panel that chooses to diverge from prior decisions is doing so knowingly, and
advisedly. This is unlikely to happen very often. Indeed, even when disagreement
"9 DSU art. 3.2.
120 The Appellate Body has its own Secretariat, staffed with lawyers that assist the Appellate
Body in conducting its work.
121 See The WTO: Secretariat and Budget, http://www.wto.ore/english/thewto e/secre e/
div e.htm.
122 For discussion of the institutions involved in WTO dispute settlement, see Bruce Wilson, The
WTO Dispute Settlement System and its Operation: a Brief Overview of the First Ten Years, in RUFUS
YERXA AND BRUCE WILSON, EDS., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS 17,23 (2005).
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exists, panels may choose not to go against the Appellate Body's rulings. The
panel report in US-Continued Zeroing illustrates this choice.'23 Nonetheless, an
occasional panel-such as the panels in US-Zeroing (Japan) and US-Stainless
Steel (Mexico)-may have reasons for rejecting the logic applied in previous
decisions, and feel that these reasons should be aired, even if the Appellate Body
will almost surely reject them. Should panels be foreclosed from expressing
themselves in these limited circumstances?
If the WTO had a functioning system of checks and balances whereby the
members exercised their legislative functions to correct the judicial arm where
appropriate, the answer might be "yes." However, the WTO is anything but
balanced in this regard. The dispute settlement system has been on the whole
widely praised, and has been, particularly in its initial years, termed "the jewel in
the crown" of the WTO.124 Although many have proposed reforms to the dispute
settlement system of one type or another,125 the judicial process has been used
regularly. Members have initiated over 400 disputes in the sixteen years since the
WTO's creation, and there has been a high overall level of compliance with
recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body.126
At the same time, the legislative functions of the WTO increasingly have
come to be viewed as inefficient or even inoperable. Formally there are rules in
place that would permit members to revise the WTO agreements or to announce
their own interpretation of a relevant provision. In particular, the Marrakesh
Agreement features provisions both permitting the amendment of the covered
agreements'27 and for the Ministerial Conference or General Council to issue an
authoritative interpretation of treaty terms.128 However, these processes are viewed
as cumbersome 29 and as a practical matter decision-making has been almost
entirely conducted in the context of multi-year rounds of trade negotiations that
address a multitude of issues.' In practice, WTO members do not engage in
123 The panel indicated its general agreement with prior panels that upheld the permissibility of
simple zeroing, but then determined it should nonetheless follow clear Appellate Body precedent.
124 See, e.g., SYLVIA OSTRY, REINFORCING THE WTO 20 (1998); Peter Sutherland, Concluding
the Uruguay Round-Creating the New Architecture of Trade for the Global Economy, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 15, 26 (2000).
125 Proposed reforms have addressed, inter alia, issues relating to remedies and compliance.
126 A number of these cases have entailed parallel proceedings in what is essentially one dispute,
and a large number of disputes have settled prior to the initiation of the panel process. Nonetheless, the
number of disputes that have been heard and resolved through the panel/Appellate Body process is
significant. This is particularly the case when contrasted with dispute settlement under the GATT,
pursuant to which somewhere in the neighborhood of 135 cases were brought and decided during the
GATT's 47-year history.
127 Marrakesh Agreement, art. X. The amendment provision has been used only once, and not in
reaction to a dispute settlement proceeding. See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641
(Dec. 8, 2005). This amendment to the intellectual property agreement allows WTO members to
produce low-cost generic pharmaceuticals pursuant to compulsory licensing, and to then export such
pharmaceuticals to countries lacking the capacity to produce them through domestic capacity.
128 Marrakesh Agreement, art. IX.2. This provision has never been invoked. See, e.g., Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article IX- 2 of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible
Improvements, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 803 (2005).
129 See, e.g., William J. Davey, Institutional Framework, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 53, 85 (2005) (noting that amending the GATT had
been viewed as all but impossible, yet the GATT provisions were imported into the WTO).130 Thomas Cottier, A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making, in REDESIGNING THE
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legislative activity in response to panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the
DSB, no matter how controversial the decision.' Thus, there is not an effective
legislative check in place to ensure panels'32 and the Appellate Body reach
outcomes with which the members agree."'
To the extent one might worry about "judicial activism," such concerns
should be magnified in a system where there is no functioning check on the
judiciary. If the judiciary's function is to interpret the law, and the legislative
branch can change the law, then the judiciary can in some ways be kept in line if
deemed necessary. However, when the legislature either cannot, or will not, change
the law, then there is no real limitation placed on the judiciary, aside from any
political factors that may temper judicial behavior.'34
In this context, I am far more sympathetic to the efforts of panels to
suggest alternative lines of reasoning or treaty interpretation, even when these clash
with previous Appellate Body decisions. For at present, there is no meaningful
review of Appellate Body decisions. To the extent panels raise new arguments,
identify flaws in previous Appellate Body reasoning, and point out the systemic
difficulties with previous jurisprudence, they are contributing to the strengthening
of the dispute settlement system, not its undoing. Such decisions force the
Appellate Body to sharpen its reasoning and to consider arguments it may not have
fully grappled with in the first instance. In other words, disagreement between
panels and the Appellate Body serves some of the same useful functions that
dissents within a panel serve. It is likely that WTO dispute settlement is going to
get more, rather than less, complicated. To the extent there are "easy" disputes,
such disputes are increasingly likely to be resolved outside the dispute settlement
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 42, 48 (Debra P. Steger, ed., 2009).
The current Doha Round has been under negotiation since late 2001.
13 Id.; see also Ehlermann, supra note 2020, at 485 (noting that even in the face of a
controversial decision, "no sustained attempt has been made to channel the criticism voiced by a large
majority of Members in the DSB against the Appellate Body's findings concerning unsolicited amicus
curiae briefs into one of the procedures provided for by Article IX or X of the Marrakesh Agreement.").
132 If a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body will have the opportunity to correct any
errors. However, when panel reports have not been appealed, the WTO membership has never taken
any formal action to correct misinterpretations of the covered agreements. As an example, the
compliance panel in the Australia-Leather dispute was widely criticized for authorizing a remedy that
required that an illegal subsidy be repaid (WTO remedies are, as a rule, not retrospective in nature), but
the case was not appealed and the WTO membership took no steps to reverse the result through
legislative action. Panel Report, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS126/RW (Jan.
21, 2000).
33 There has been one notable instance when the vast majority of the WTO membership reacted
negatively to a decision of the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body determined that it had the
authority (drawing upon very general language in Article 13 of the DSU) to accept amicus briefs and
establish procedures for their submission and consideration. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 6, 1998).
At a special meeting of the General Council, the majority of the delegations that spoke raised objections
to the Appellate Body's actions, arguing that the Appellate Body did not have the power to accept
amicus briefs and was overstepping its mandate. Notwithstanding the widespread dissatisfaction with
the Appellate Body's ruling, no efforts were made to either issue an authoritative interpretation under
Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement or to amend the DSU, under Article X of the Marrakesh
Agreement. Members simply have not used these mechanisms in response to panel or Appellate Body
decisions, and seem unlikely to do so in the future.
134 See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 263-65 (2004) (identifying political checks on judicial
activism by the Appellate Body).
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process or in the initial phases of a dispute.13 The dispute settlement system is
therefore likely to face more difficult cases going forward, including cases where
the highly textual style of analysis favored by the Appellate Body may not yield a
clear answer due to gaps in the treaty language or unclear provisions. These are
precisely the cases where the Appellate Body is most vulnerable to charges of being
"activist" and to being criticized (even if not corrected) by WTO members.
Vertical disagreement can therefore be seen as a dialogue between a panel
and the Appellate Body (or perhaps between the Rules or Legal Affairs Division
and the Appellate Body Secretariat), where the panel is signaling interpretive or
practical problems with the Appellate Body's previous decision or decisions. This
appears to be what the US-Zeroing (Japan) and US Stainless Steel-Mexico
panels were attempting to do. Surely both panels knew they would be reversed on
the law." 6 However, they felt the Appellate Body's decision in US-Zeroing (EC)
left open potentially anomalous situations, as well as appeared to render a portion of
the ADA inutile. When the Appellate Body in the US-Zeroing (Japan) case did
not respond fully to aspects of the panel's legal analysis,'"3 the US Stainless Steel-
Mexico panel subsequently highlighted these gaps in the Appellate Body's analysis
as a partial explanation for why it felt it necessary to raise afresh arguments that the
US-Zeroing (Japan) panel had made, but the Appellate Body had rejected. 8
Thus as a general matter it would be a mistake for the Appellate Body to
foreclose the possibility of panels disagreeing with the Appellate Body. If the
"absent cogent reasons" language is interpreted to mean only that panels may
diverge from previous panel decisions, and that Appellate Body divisions may
diverge from previous Appellate Body decisions, then panels will as a practical
matter have little about which they would have occasion to disagree.
Approximately 70 percent of panel reports have been appealed.'3 9 Therefore, the
number of unappealed panel reports is relatively small. And to the extent a panel
makes a decision that is controversial, it is probably more likely to be appealed (and
" Members have the benefit of the cases that have already been decided, and may therefore
decide to "bargain in the shadow of the law." Research suggests that members do bargain in the
shadow of the law, even though WTO law can be termed "weak" in that it can be difficult (and
occasionally impossible) to get a member to comply with an adverse ruling. See Marc L. Busch & Eric
Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATZ/WTO Disputes, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 158 (2000); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, II J. OF LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
136 As is discussed below, the US-Zeroing (EC) and Softwood Lumber V (21.5) panels may also
have been engaging in similar signaling efforts, though it was less obvious that the Appellate Body
would reverse these panels as it had not yet issued a report assessing the types of zeroing these panels
addressed.
'3 See, e.g., Voon, supra note 52, at 225 (noting that the Appellate Body in United States-
Zeroing (Japan) (AB), supra note 90, conducted little positive analysis, and instead mainly rebutted the
panel on the question of whether simple zeroing was inconsistent in new shipper and periodic
(administrative) reviews, as such, with ADA arts. 2.4, 9.3, and 9.5).
138 See, e.g., US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 73, $T 7.118-121 (identifying, with respect
to issues arising under Articles VI:1 and VI:2 of GATT 1994 and ADA art. 2.1, arguments of the US-
Zeroing (Japan) panel the Appellate Body had not addressed and issues for which the Appellate Body
had not provided detailed reasoning to support its position), 7.127-133 (discussing, with respect to
ADA art. 9.3, why it disagrees with the Appellate Body's rejection of the US-Zeroing (Japan) panel's
arguments), 7.137-143 (identifying flaws in the Appellate Body's logic in US-Zeroing (Japan) with
respect to whether the Appellate Body's approach renders inutile part of ADA art. 2.4.2), and 7.146-
147 (identifying potential negative consequences of establishing a general prohibition on zeroing).
139 See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Annual Report for 2010, WT/AB/15 (July 18,
2011) (sixty-seven percent of panel reports issued between 1995 and 2010 were appealed).
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therefore off limits for future disagreement) than a non-contentious report.
There is no suggestion that dissent within a panel is impermissible, even
when the dissenter's basis for disagreeing lies in the belief that Appellate Body
precedent is incorrect. It would be incongruous to impose more restrictions on
panels when their level of concern with previous Appellate Body rulings rises to the
level of a majority (or unanimity) within the panel. To the extent that there is value
in airing disagreement at all, it would seem that value increases when there is more,
rather than less, disagreement.
Further, if the Appellate Body were to interpret its previous language to
mean that panels must follow all Appellate Body precedents, this would arguably
violate Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU by diminishing the rights of members, and
violate Article 11 by preventing panels from conducting an objective assessment.
Let us assume that the Appellate Body were to adopt such a rule. If a future
zeroing-related dispute arose between two WTO members heretofore uninvolved in
the zeroing cases, the respondent would have less of a true opportunity to have its
defense heard than if the panel had the flexibility to consider new arguments, even
if such arguments called into question Appellate Body precedent. Further, the
panel's ability to objectively assess new arguments and new contexts fully would
be constrained by the requirement to follow precedent. This would have the
practical effect of imposing stare decisis in the WTO context, and would arguably
deny WTO members involved in subsequent disputes of due process.140 The panel
in US-Stainless Steel (Mexico) shared this concern:
We recall that we are not, strictly speaking, bound by previous Appellate
Body or panel decisions that have addressed the same issue, i.e. simple
zeroing in periodic reviews, which is before us in these proceedings. There
is no provision in the DSU that requires WTO panels to follow the findings
of previous panels or the Appellate Body on the same issues brought before
them. In principle, a panel or Appellate Body decision only binds the
parties to the relevant dispute. Certain provisions of the DSU, in our view,
support this proposition. According to Article 19.2 of the DSU, for
example, "[i]n accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings
and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. In
the same vein, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that "[r]ecommendations
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements."41
140 The Appellate Body has stated that the obligation to afford due process is "inherent in the
WTO dispute settlement system." Appellate Body Report, Chile-Price Band System and Certain
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 1 176, WT/DS 2017/AB/R (Sept. 23, 2002). See
also Appellate Body Report, Mexico Antidumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, 107,
WT/DSl32/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Appellate Body Report, Thailand-Antidumping Duties on
Angles, Shapes and Section of Iron or Non-alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, $ 88,
WT/DS/122/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); Appellate Body Report, Canada Continued Suspension of
Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 433, WT/DS32 1/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008).
141 US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 73, 1 7.102.
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C. What Would Constitute "Cogent Reasons" to Disregard Precedent?
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that it is undesirable to require
panels to follow Appellate Body precedent in all cases. At the same time, panels
should not disregard precedent lightly. In a two-tiered system of dispute settlement,
it is logical to expect the lower tier to follow the lead of the top tier. And in light of
the DSU's stated objective in Article 3.2 of providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system, it must be acknowledged that following precedent
does contribute to security and predictability. It is therefore appropriate to follow
Appellate Body precedent unless there is a strong countervailing reason not to. The
Appellate Body's requirement in United States-Stainless Steel (Mexico) of
"cogent reasons" seems reasonable in this regard. But what would constitute
cogent reasons?
Before reaching this question, a panel must conduct its analyses consistent
with the provisions of the DSU. It is therefore a prerequisite for any panel
considering diverging from precedent to have: assessed the factual and legal issues
in good faith; conducted an objective assessment of the matter before it; ensured its
outcome will not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of WTO members;
and applied the VCLT rules of treaty interpretation, particularly being mindful that
the object and purpose of WTO dispute settlement is in part to provide security and
predictability in the multilateral trading system.142 Assuming that a panel has
followed the procedural mandates of the DSU and has determined that diverging
from precedent would, in the given case, not be inconsistent with those mandates, it
could then opt to disregard precedent, but only in the presence of cogent reasons.
Below I identify four possible factorsl43 to take into account when determining
whether cogent reasons exist.
1. Where a textual interpretation either has not been conducted or has not
yielded a clear and definitive result
In the zeroing cases, part of the difficulty has arisen from the fact that,
particularly in its earliest decisions on the subject, the Appellate Body did not
ground its reasoning in the text of the Antidumping Agreement. It has relied on
terminology such as "the product as a whole" that is found nowhere in the treaty,
but rather was suggested by the European Communities in their briefs. This has
opened the Appellate Body to criticism that it is taking too much of a teleological
approach or, to put it more critically, that it is being activist.'" In the zeroing
context, many would argue that a textual approach was possible. However, in some
instances, the relevant treaty text will be unclear or silent with respect to a
particular issue. In this context, the Appellate Body may find it necessary to engage
in a degree of gap-filling. To the extent gap-filling is required in certain contexts,
142 DSU arts. 3.2, 11, 19.2.
143 These are intended to be illustrative examples rather than to comprise a closed list of
possibilities.
'4 Not everyone disapproves of the teleological shift. Sungjoon Cho readily acknowledges the
teleological nature of the Appellate Body's zeroing jurisprudence, but applauds rather than condemns
the change in approach. Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PENN. J. INT'L L. 621
(2010).
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this is where the Appellate Body is going to be most vulnerable to criticism and
where allowing all views to be aired will help to provide some added legitimacy to
a controversial undertaking.145
2. Where the area under consideration has not crystallized into a definitive,
accepted practice
Many Appellate Body reports have established tests to interpret particular
treaty provisions, and others have made a variety of interpretive pronouncements.
These tests and pronouncements have then been used in numerous subsequent cases
over a period of many years.14 6 It would be less appropriate for a panel to try to
design a new test or legal principle in such circumstances (particularly if there had
not been any major concerns raised about the workability thereof) than if there had
been only one isolated application of a legal principle by the Appellate Body. This
is not to suggest that panels should make it their business to design new tests as a
routine matter, but rather to say that the more well-accepted (by other panels as well
as the Appellate Body) and frequently applied a legal principle is, the less likely
there would be cogent reasons for diverging from said principle.147 In the context of
the zeroing cases, the findings with respect to the WA-WA methodology provide a
useful example. No panel (or Appellate Body division) has ever found zeroing in
the WA-WA context to be permissible. All of the disagreement arises out of the
use of zeroing in contexts other than WA-WA comparisons. Because there has
been sustained unanimity on this issue at both panel and Appellate Body level, it
would be difficult to imagine a cogent reason for a panel to now argue that zeroing
in the WA-WA context is permissible.
3. Where the legal issue is likely to be subject to repeated consideration in a
variety of contexts
Certain disputes revolve around legal questions that are likely to recur,
albeit in different guises, while others involve more esoteric questions that may not
arise again. For the former, it is particularly important that panel and Appellate
Body decisions be carefully crafted so as not to create a difficulty for a later, related
145 A teleological approach may be appropriate where a textual interpretation does not yield a
clear result. I am therefore not arguing against teleological interpretations in general, but instead noting
that when such an approach is used, it may be particularly appropriate to ensure any objections thereto
are voiced.
146 For example, the tests from the Appellate Body report in the Australia-Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, WT/DSI8/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998), case have been used in multiple cases to
interpret Articles 5.1 and 5.6 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement.
147 Interestingly, in a recent article Sungjoon Cho has suggested that the Appellate Body's zeroing
jurisprudence represents, in its decision not to apply a textual, VCLT approach, a form of constitutional
lawmaking. He suggests that as a form of constitutional lawmaking, the current jurisprudence should
not be subject to reversal via a declaration, which could be negotiated amongst WTO members.
Instead, he argues that the zeroing decisions should only be subject to change via the supermajority
amendment rules in Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement. Cho, supra note 144, at 652. 1 disagree
with this suggestion. The fact that the Appellate Body has chosen a teleological path in the zeroing
cases should not elevate these decisions above and beyond the status of any other decisions. Given that
these decisions were reached using a methodology different from that prescribed by the WTO
membership, it would be particularly inappropriate to privilege these decisions.
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fact situation. Because these decisions are likely to have ramifications in numerous
further cases, it is more important that any flaw in the initial case reasoning be
identified so that it may be corrected relatively early in the chain of decisions.'48
4. Where the panel has a new argument to make or determines additional
Appellate Body clarification is necessary
If a panel disagrees with Appellate Body logic but has no new arguments
to make other than those already raised by previous panels and thoroughly
addressed by the Appellate Body, it is unlikely to have cogent reasons to diverge
from the Appellate Body precedent because it is not disagreeing in furtherance of
the dialectic. The balance between conducting an objective assessment pursuant to
Article 11 of the DSU and the goal of providing security and predictability dictates
this result. If the Appellate Body has already considered and rejected precisely the
arguments a panel would raise, the panel should not re-raise these issues. The panel
could, if it felt so compelled, note that it agrees with the previous rejected
arguments while nonetheless following the Appellate Body's rulings. This was the
approach adopted by the panel majority in the US-Continued Zeroing'49 case.
VI. PUTTING THE DISSENTING PANELS TO THE TEST
There have been four panels that have arguably dissented from previous
Appellate Body rulings, all in the context of zeroing. These four panels each issued
reports upholding the use of at least one form of zeroing: US-Zeroing (EC); US-
Softwood Lumber V (21.5);"so US-Zeroing (Japan); and US-Stainless Steel
(Mexico). The first of these panels comprised two members finding a form of
zeroing to be permissible and one member dissenting from this view. The
subsequent three panels were each unanimous in finding that at least one form of
zeroing was permissible. In all four cases, the Appellate Body reversed the findings
that any form of zeroing was permissible. This section briefly discusses the ways in
which each panel characterized their disagreement with the Appellate Body's
previous determinations (which began with the EC-Bed Linen case in 2001)"'
148 Judge Patricia Wald supports this approach: "[o]n the heated issue of duress as a defense to a
war crime or crime against humanity, the ICC-written law has chosen to follow the dissent of ICTY
President Antonio Cassese rather than the ICTY majority in supporting such a defense. This example,
incidentally, reinforces for me the value of dissent in a rapidly moving international jurisprudence.
Originally, some scholars thought dissents should not be allowed in order to preserve the cloak of unity.
Time has, I believe, shown that in international courts, as well as national ones, dissent is especially
vital and particularly useful when precedent does not rule out choices for later courts, and yet there may
be few, if any, rulings in different courts for newly-constituted courts to choose from." See Patricia M.
Wald, Tribunal Discourse and Intercourse: How the International Courts Speak to One Another, 30
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 15 (2007). Judge Wald served on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit from 1979 to 1999. She was also a judge at the UN International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from 1999 to 2001.
149 Panel Report, US-Continued Zeroing, supra note 94.
1so 21.5 refers to proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, pursuant to which a panel
determines whether a member previously found to have been in violation of a WTO commitment has in
fact complied with the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body that the member bring its
measures into conformity with the relevant covered agreements.
1 EC-Bed Linen, supra note 47.
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finding various uses of zeroing to be inconsistent with the WTO's ADA. It
additionally assesses in each instance whether the panel's vertical disagreement is
problematic given the criteria identified above.
A. US-Zeroing (EC)
This dispute involved challenges to the use of zeroing in the WA-WA
context (what the EC refers to as "model zeroing") and to the use of zeroing in the
WA-T context (which the EC refers to as "simple zeroing"). With respect to the
question of WA-WA or model zeroing, the panel noted that the legal issue was
"identical" to that addressed by the Appellate Body in EC-Bed Linen and US-
Softwood Lumber V and stated that while "previous Appellate Body decisions are
not strictly speaking binding on panels, there clearly is an expectation that panels
will follow such decisions in subsequent cases raising issues that the Appellate
Body has expressly addressed." 52
The EC argued that the Appellate Body's logic in EC-Bed Linen and
US-Softwood Lumber V should lead to the conclusion that zeroing is also
impermissible in the WA-T or simple zeroing context.' However, the panel
distinguished the previous cases, noting that the relevant provision of the
Antidumping Agreement at issue in the earlier disputes (Article 2.4.2) refers to "the
investigation phase." In the present dispute, zeroing had been used in WA-T
comparisons in new shipper reviews, changed circumstances reviews,
administrative reviews, and sunset reviews-but not in original investigations. The
reviews at issue are governed by Article 9.3 of the ADA. The panel thus addressed
whether the requirements of Article 2.4.2 apply outside the context of original
investigations to the reviews covered by Article 9.3, finding in the negative. 15 4 One
panelist disagreed with this latter conclusion and would have found zeroing
prohibited in the WA-T transactions at issue.
This panel was the first to address zeroing outside of the WA-WA context.
Although the Appellate Body's reasoning in the WA-WA cases may have
suggested that it would not approve of zeroing in other contexts, the Appellate
Body had not in fact opined as to these issues. Thus this panel was able to
distinguish the issue of zeroing in the context of particular WA-T comparisons from
the question the Appellate Body had previously addressed and did not disagree with
an explicit finding of the Appellate Body. Because this panel was faced with a
novel issue of law, it cannot be faulted for conducting its own analysis. Indeed, the
panel did a laudable job of using the text to explain why it felt the Appellate Body's
2.4.2 analysis should not apply to Article 9.3. The panel may have intuited the
direction the Appellate Body would be inclined to take and as such spelled out the
logic of its own approach. The panel thus set the stage for a dialogue over the new
legal issue.
152 US-Zeroing (EC), supra note 48, 7.28-7.31.
" Id.at 7.144.
154 Id at 17.148-7.220.
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B. US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5)
In the original US-Softwood Lumber V case, the United States had
engaged in zeroing in the context of conducting a weighted average-weighted
average comparison. The panel had found two to one, and the Appellate Body had
affirmed, that zeroing was not permitted in the WA-WA context. This was
consistent with the Appellate Body's finding in the EC-Bed Linen case, which had
also addressed zeroing in the WA-WA context. Subsequently, the United States
elected to comply with the Softwood Lumber V reports by altering its methodology
to compare sales using the transaction-to-transaction (T-T) methodology and to use
zeroing in this context. Canada initiated a proceeding pursuant to Article 21.5 of
the DSU, arguing that zeroing is also prohibited in the T-T context and that
therefore the United States was not in compliance with the original findings.
Canada argued that the Appellate Body's logic in finding zeroing
impermissible in the WA-WA context dictated a similar finding for zeroing in the
T-T context.15' The United States responded that while the Appellate Body had
relied on the terms "margins of dumping" and "all comparable export transactions"
in Article 2.4.2 of the ADA to find zeroing impermissible in the WA-WA context,
these terms only appear in reference to WA-WA comparisons, and not in the part of
2.4.2 directed at T-T comparisons.
The panel emphasized that the Appellate Body had limited its
consideration to the WA-WA context, and that the Appellate Body's reasoning,
while logical in the WA-WA context, did not marry well with the portion of Article
2.4.2 directed at T-T comparisons. The panel agreed with the United States that the
terms "margins of dumping" and "all comparable export transactions" do not apply
to T-T comparisons and concluded that zeroing in the context of T-T comparisons
is permissible.'
The panel then went further and engaged in a lengthy discussion of why it
would pose interpretive problems to extend the Appellate Body's Softwood Lumber
V'" analysis beyond the WA-WA context."9 This exposition was not necessarily
essential to the resolution of the dispute and perhaps signals that the panel believed
the Appellate Body was likely to extend its findings with respect to zeroing beyond
the WA-WA context. To be more precise, it seems likely that the Rules Division
lawyers recognized that the Appellate Body (supported by the Appellate Body
Secretariat lawyers) would be inclined to extend its zeroing findings and had
concerns that such an outcome would prove problematic. The Rules Division may
therefore have encouraged the panel to develop the dicta in this panel report as a
way for itself to engage indirectly in a dialogue with the Appellate Body and its
Secretariat lawyers. In any event, as with the US-Zeroing (EC) panel, while the
155 US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5), supra note 73, 5.11-5.14.
156 Id at 5.15.
15 Id at 5.20-5.30.
58 The panel circulated its final report on April 3, 2006 and therefore did not have the benefit of
the Appellate Body's decision in US-Zeroing (EC) (in which the Appellate Body reversed the panel's
finding that zeroing was permissible in reviews conducting using the WA-T methodology), as that
report had not yet been circulated. The timing was very close however; the Appellate Body report in
US Zeroing (EC) was circulated on April 18, 2006.
15 US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5), supra note 73, 5.31-5.66.
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panel disagreed with the position the Appellate Body was likely to take, it did not
diverge from any substantive legal findings of the Appellate Body.
The US-Zeroing (Japan) case was the first zeroing dispute in which a
panel explicitly disagreed with previous Appellate Body precedent. Shortly after
this panel circulated its interim report, the Appellate Body issued its report in US-
Zeroing (EC) (finding WA-T zeroing impermissible). The US-Zeroing (Japan)
panel deferred the release of its final report to allow the parties to address in what
ways they felt the panel should take into account the Appellate Body's rulings. The
panel found zeroing prohibited in the WA-WA contexts at issue.160 However, it
declined to follow the Appellate Body's reasoning in US-Zeroing (EC) with
respect to zeroing in the WA-T context, and found that numerous instances of WA-
T and T-T zeroing were permissible. 6 ' This case engendered negative feelings
amongst some delegations and lawyers within the Appellate Body Secretariat, as
some believed the panel had called particular attention to itself and its refusal to
follow precedent by delaying its decision yet not altering its conclusion,
notwithstanding the Appellate Body's clear, contrary position with respect to
zeroing in the WA-T context.
The panel made reference to certain arguments raised by the US-Zeroing
(EC) and US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5) panels, but also applied its own detailed
interpretation of the relevant ADA provisions, using the VCLT to examine the
interconnections between treaty provisions. The panel was particularly concerned
that following the Appellate Body's approach would render a portion of Article
2.4.2 inutile, arguing that prohibiting zeroing in the WA-T context as well as the
WA-WA context would make it impossible to give effect to all three listed
methodologies, as the WA-T methodology would necessarily generate
mathematically equivalent results to the WA-WA methodology.162 The panel made
clear that its own answers were not entirely satisfactory, but that for systemic
purposes, its approach was preferable to the Appellate Body's:
[W]hile we realize that certain anomalies arise if Article 2.4.2 is interpreted
as only prohibiting the use of zeroing in connection with the average-to-
average comparison method, we consider that an interpretation of Article
2.4.2 as prohibiting zeroing under all comparison methods is even more
problematic from the perspective of a coherent approach to the
interpretation of Article 2.4.2.163
Thus it appears that this panel-which included two long-term government
trade officials and a lawyer with an antidumping practice-was grappling with
establishing an approach that would be coherent across all of the different
comparisons permitted by Article 2.4.2, while being consistent with a VCLT
analysis. The panel was rather brave to speak out in opposition to the Appellate
Body's approach, and its arguments, while some may disagree with them on
160 US-Zeroing (Japan), supra note 51, $T 7.82-7.86.
161 The Appellate Body's report in US-Softwood Lumber V (21.5) (in which it found instances of
T-T zeroing impermissible) was issued close in time to this report, but likely was not available in time
for this panel to reference it.
162 US-Zeroing (Japan), supra note 51, % 7.115-7.161.
163 Id. at 7.126.
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substance, were certainly not spurious. The panel identified a number of issues for
which the Appellate Body's reasoning would prove problematic, and it was
therefore useful for the panel to express these concerns, extending the panels'
dialectic with the Appellate Body.
C. US-Stainless Steel (Mexico)
By the time the US-Stainless Steel (Mexico) panel issued its report, the
Appellate Body had issued its reports in US-Zeroing (EC); US-Softwood Lumber
V (21.5), and in US-Zeroing (Japan)-all reports where the Appellate Body
uniformly rejected as impermissible every type of zeroing challenged. Further, the
preceding two panels had gone into great detail as to why they believed the
Appellate Body should limit its prohibition on zeroing to the WA-WA context, yet
the Appellate Body had roundly rejected all of these arguments.
The panel found, as all panels have, that the challenged uses of zeroing in
the WA-WA context were WTO-inconsistent. However, the panel denied Mexico's
claims with respect to zeroing in the WA-T context, largely relying upon arguments
the Appellate Body had rejected in its US-Zeroing (Japan) report. The panel
made clear that it was aware of the Appellate Body's previous rulings, but
identified a number of issues for which it believed the Appellate Body had not fully
enough explained its positions." In addition, the panel explained in some detail
why it disagreed with certain legal determinations the Appellate Body had reached,
why those determinations were problematic more broadly, and why it therefore
could not follow those decisions.'65
Many reacted negatively to this panel's actions, calling it "rebellious" 6 1
and objecting strongly to its failure to follow precedent. There appeared to be a
general frustration in Geneva that panels were persisting on finding zeroing
permissible, even though it was entirely clear the Appellate Body would overrule
them. Indeed, the Appellate Body itself responded (in addition to overruling the
panel on the findings permitting zeroing) by strongly emphasizing the expectation
that precedent be followed. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body also responded to a
variety of issues raised by the panel.6' Although it may not have done so to the
satisfaction of the panel and others who fundamentally disagree with the Appellate
Body's position, it did at least continue to advance the dialogue.
This panel seemed clearly to recognize that it would be reversed with
respect to its findings permitting zeroing. In this regard, the panel report appears to
have had the objective of conveying to the Appellate Body the difficulties the
Appellate Body's decisions could cause for WTO members in their administration
of members' antidumping laws. As such, the panel seems to be imploring the
Appellate Body to give fuller, more detailed guidance and explanations with respect
' US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 73, IT 7.118-7.121.
165 Id. TT 7.127-7.147.
166 See Cho, supra note 92.
67 For detailed discussions of the Appellate Body's decision, see Recent International Decision,
supra note 96, at 122; Simon Lester, United States-Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steelfrom Mexico, 102 AM. J. INT'L L 834 (2008); Eric Langland, United States-Final Anti-dumping
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico: Row over Zeroing Reveals Judicial Quagmire, 17 TULANE J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 555 (2009).
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to some of the more contested legal issues. Hence while the panel is clearly
disagreeing with the Appellate Body's previous decisions, and in some senses its
actions can be seen as a last ditch effort to convince the Appellate Body of
interpretations it had already rejected,6 it does not seem to be acting lightly. It is
attempting to advance the discussion by encouraging the Appellate Body to further
clarify the reasoning of its own decisions. For these reasons, the panel does not
deserve the harsh criticisms some have leveled against it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both horizontal and vertical disagreement can serve useful functions in
WTO dispute settlement. Dissent, in whatever form, can be seen as an effort to
engage in a dialectic or dialogue. In the case of horizontal disagreement, dissent
within a panel conveys useful information to the Appellate Body-namely that
there are competing approaches to the legal issue at hand. The Appellate Body's
decision will benefit from this knowledge, as the Appellate Body will consider both
approaches, and expound upon why one or the other is more persuasive and thus
preferred. In practice, the reasoning applied in panelists' dissents has been adopted
by the Appellate Body on more than one occasion. Yet even when the dissenter's
view is not adopted, it still should not be seen as "wrong" or "unnecessary" as the
presence of the minority position will require the Appellate Body to provide
reasoning that will be useful guidance for WTO members and for future panelists.
Vertical dissent poses potentially more serious concerns because wholesale
failure of panels to follow Appellate Body precedents could undermine and
ultimately destroy the WTO dispute settlement system. However, the Appellate
Body has struck the proper balance by stating that "absent cogent reasons" previous
decisions should be followed. This leaves open the possibility that panels could
have good cause to diverge from previous decisions of the Appellate Body. If a
panel is acting in good faith, and nonetheless believes its duties under the DSU
require it to reject Appellate Body precedent, then cogent reasons may exist for this
view. There are many possible cogent reasons; this article suggests but four
possible ones. The important point is not to definitively identify all potential
cogent reasons, but instead to acknowledge that such circumstances, albeit rare,
may arise. Should a panel have cogent reasons to diverge, it should be permitted to
do so. Its reasoning should be taken as an attempt to engage in a constructive
dialogue with the Appellate Body; to address and ideally remedy concerns raised by
the Appellate Body's original logic.
Although the zeroing cases have revealed high levels of disagreement
between panels and the Appellate Body, these "dissenting panels" do not signal a
breakdown in the hierarchy, or any other grave problem. In a system where there is
little effective check on the Appellate Body, it is important that panelists-who
may have practical experience with the issues-be able to identify potential
difficulties with the Appellate Body's analyses. Airing disagreement has served
168 Indeed, the next zeroing panel (US-Continued Zeroing), although in agreement with the
substance of the US-Stainless Steel (Mexico) and US-Zeroing (Japan) panel reports, apparently saw
no room for further dialogue and thus followed the Appellate Body's precedents. See US-Continued
Zeroing, supra note 56, 7.168-7.182.
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useful purposes in WTO dispute settlement as dialectic, whether expressed
horizontally or vertically.
Within a panel, dissent illustrates competing approaches to the same issue.
Both sides will sharpen their reasoning to highlight their unique points of view.
This exposition of disagreement in turn can be useful to the Appellate Body, which
has the opportunity to evaluate the merits of the different arguments. The Appellate
Body has in fact adopted the views of dissenting panelists on multiple occasions,
illustrating the usefulness of these expressions of disagreement.
Between panels and the Appellate Body, disagreement will be rarer, but
therefore usually of significance when it occurs. If a panel feels strongly enough to
object to Appellate Body precedent, it likely signals a serious concern that the
Appellate Body's reasoning is questionable or may lead to later undesirable
outcomes. In this context, it is better for the Appellate Body to be given the
opportunity to refine and/or further explain its reasoning (as it has done in the later
zeroing reports) than for a series of ultimately unsatisfying and problematic reports
to accumulate. Assuming that panels have cogent reasons for disagreeing, it should
be the case that the decision to pursue a dialogue with the Appellate Body either
serves a positive purpose or, at a minimum, will not cause more harm than good.
In the context of the zeroing cases, the process has been surprising, but the
end result can be viewed as a success for the system. Panels aired their concerns
with the initial Appellate Body reports, and the Appellate Body responded by using
more complete reasoning and more faithful reference to the VCLT in its later
reports. This cycle has reflected the use of the dialectical process to ultimately
reach better outcomes in WTO dispute settlement. While a series of panels
disagreed with the Appellate Body, there came a time-as one would predict-
when further dialogue came to be viewed as futile because the discussion had run
its course, and thus the panel in US-Continued Zeroing decided to follow the
Appellate Body's precedents (notwithstanding its stated support for the reasoning
of the previous "dissenting" panels). The cycle has thus reached a conclusion.
Panels have reverted to following the Appellate Body, even without the Appellate
Body forcing them to do so by forbidding them to depart from Appellate Body
precedent. The Appellate Body, in exercising this restraint, has done far more for
its legitimacy than it could ever hope to do by prohibiting opposition.
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